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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this global market economy, everything is now up for sale, even areas 
of life once considered sacred, such as health and education, culture and 
heritage, genetic codes and seeds, and natural resources, including air and 
water. – Barlow and Clarke (2002) 
 
Municipal IQ (2010) notes that from January 2009 to December 2009, a record 
high of 105 service delivery protests were reported throughout South Africa. This 
figure dwarfs the total of 27 reached in 2008 and 31 counted in 2007. In 2010, 107 
protests occurred (ibid). These protests suggest that people are discontent about, 
or lack access to, basic services such as water and electricity. This raises a 
pertinent question about whether intergovernmental transfers, such as the local 
government equitable share, are succeeding in facilitating the provision of 
adequate free basic services to the poor.  
 
In most developing countries, intergovernmental transfers account for the 
dominant share of revenue available for lower levels of government to utilise in 
furnishing their expenditure needs (Shah 1994 and Bahl 2000). The term 
“intergovernmental transfers” generally refers to different kinds of public 
financing tools including grants, shared taxes and subsidies that flow from the 
central government to the other spheres of government, such as provinces and 
municipalities. In South Africa, the Constitution recognises intergovernmental 
transfers, including the equitable share and other grants (Republic of South Africa 
1996). As the Constitution states, local governments and provinces are entitled to 
an equitable share of revenue raised by the national government to enable them to 
provide basic services and perform the constitutional obligations assigned to 
them. The Constitution also notes that everyone has the right to have access to 
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health care services, including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; 
and social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance (ibid).  
 
However, the commodification imperatives have deprived the poor of these 
constitutionally recognised basic services. Basic services are slapped with a price 
tag like any product that is available off the shelf. Transfers have failed to assist a 
swathe of poor households to access basic services. Some theorists now argue that 
municipal services like water should not be commodified at all as they are a basic 
right. This implies that prices should be eliminated from essential services, thus 
achieving decommodification. Access to water, as Gleick (1999: 3) argues, is a 
basic human right that is enshrined in international law, declarations and state 
practices. The word “right”, according to Gleick, means that states have a “duty to 
protect and promote those rights for an individual”. The South African 
Constitution embraces this “human rights” view, as has been noted above.  
 
Others argue for an equitable allocation of basic services like water across 
“economically disparate groups” (Dinar et al 1997: 4) of users. In the case of 
water, for example, an equitable allocation of water resources suggests that all 
households, regardless of whether they afford or not to purchase water, still have a 
basic right to water services. Dinar et al state that meeting this equitable allocation 
objective may entail providing government subsidies or free services, or perhaps 
adopting a “differential pricing structure” based on income. The South African 
government is trying to apply this “equitable allocation” approach and the 
transfers system is designed to achieve this goal.  
 
But South Africa‟s endeavours fall short of bridging the gulf between previously 
advantaged white people and their previously disadvantaged black counterparts. 
This is solely because transfers benefit only poor people who are on indigent 
registers. But in most municipalities indigent registers grossly under-represent 
those who actually qualify and would greatly benefit from this free allocation. 
Johannesburg‟s indigent register currently reflects 108 000 registered households 
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(Tissington et al, 2008: 36). But household data from Statistics South Africa and 
information from the city‟s 2005 Human Development Strategy show that there 
are an estimated 500 000 households that formally qualify as indigent (ibid). This 
goes to show that a vast majority of poor households fall through the crack. Put 
bluntly, they are not guaranteed even the most basic minimum services.  
 
Aims of the study 
 
In theory, intergovernmental transfers assist lower levels of government such as 
municipalities to furnish their expenditure requirements. As for South Africa, this 
theoretical premise needs to be placed within the context of the restructuring of 
transfers since 1994. The historical regional disparities and the permeation of 
commodification into the policy-making machinery at the local government level 
have both transformed the nature of transfers. The aim of this study is to 
concentrate on how the government has restructured transfers, and whether in 
practice transfers do help municipalities fulfil their constitutional obligations and 
responsibilities in delivering free basic services.  
 
This research report takes a closer look at the local government equitable share 
and explores its role in funding the provision of, and the facilitation of access to, 
free basic services. This unconditional grant provides all municipalities with 
additional external financial resources to help them meet expenditure needs, 
including delivering basic services to indigent households. Understanding how 
this unconditional grant has been restructured as the source of finance for free 
basic services would cast light on whether or not it is effective in reducing 
inequities, inequalities and regional disparities. The Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant (MIG) also comes under empirical scrutiny as it is instrumental in 
addressing basic service infrastructure backlog. This study also examines the 
model that is used to calculate the local government equitable share and the MIG.  
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Finally, the research report seeks to ascertain if transfers accurately target poor 
people, who are intended to benefit from it. To dissect this aspect of the study, the 
indigent policy is zeroed in on to explore how poor people are screened and how 
the indigent policy is administered. It also examines the “culture of non-payment” 
and what underpins it.  
 
Research question 
 
Main question 
 
Has the restructuring of the South African intergovernmental transfer system 
assisted local government in meeting the service delivery needs of the poor?  
 
Subsidiary questions 
 
 How are intergovernmental transfers structured to target the poor?  
 How has the restructuring of transfers affected the local government‟s 
ability to provide free basic services to the poor?  
 Are transfers targeted at the intended recipients through indigent policy 
and is this policy an appropriate vehicle to deliver free basic services?  
 What are the challenges confronting the implementation of the new 
intergovernmental transfer system at the local government level?  
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Rationale of the study 
 
The South African government has promised that it will continue to fight poverty 
through social grants, improvement of infrastructure and increased provision of 
services such as water, sanitation and electricity, but delivery on these promises is 
slow (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009: 59). In large part, the slowness in delivery has 
historical roots. Apartheid planning established black areas away from industrial 
and commercial hubs, which serve as the crucial sources of revenue for local 
governments. Formerly white areas had solid industrial and commercial bases, 
which enabled them to satisfy expenditure needs from own-generated revenue. 
With economic activities severely curtailed, black neighbourhoods barely 
generated sufficient income from taxes and rates. This made it increasingly 
difficult for them to provide services like water to their communities without 
massive inflow of grants and subsidies. Despite inflow of transfers, inequalities 
and poverty remain glaring in black areas. As the Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policy (Department of Provincial and Local Government [DPLG] 2005) 
points out, the inequitable policies of the past, the pre-1994 era, resulted in 
“exclusion from access to basic services by the poor”.  
 
In the post-1994 period, intergovernmental transfers seek to remedy apartheid-era 
inequitable policies and exclusion. The state‟s official stance is that transfers play 
a redistributive role and ensure that access to basic services is guaranteed even in 
poor areas. According to the working document entitled, “State of Local 
Government in South Africa: Overview Report”, the term redistribution means 
that transfers‟ central role is to redress “the country‟s history of inequity and 
inequalities” (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
[CoGTA] 2009: 58). But post-1994, development and economic advancement are 
still concentrated in formerly white areas, while poverty is prevalent in previously 
black ones.  
 
As the state has reassured that intergovernmental transfers play a redistributive 
role, it has simultaneously scaled back these grants and subsidies in line with the 
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proliferation of commodification at the local government level. This is a 
contradiction in terms. Logically, if the state wants to attain redistribution it 
should increase transfers, not cut them. Diminished transfers exacerbate 
inequalities and poverty, which manifested during apartheid. In the aftermath of 
apartheid, most municipalities, outside metropolitan places like the City of 
Johannesburg and secondary cities such as Mogale City Local Municipality, still 
have limited revenue-raising capacity and yet they receive miniscule transfers.  
 
There is much empirical evidence that the poor lack basic services because they 
cannot afford them, while at the same time inadequate grants leave municipalities 
with no other means to finance the provision of these. For instance, the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (2009) estimates about 5.7 million 
people, which is 12% of an estimated population of 48.7 million, still have no 
access to safe water. There are some social consequences for lack of access to 
clean, potable water. For example, the change from the free communal tap to the 
pre-paid meter tap sparked the cholera outbreak in 2000 in KwaZulu-Natal, 
affecting over 120 000 people and resulting in more than 300 deaths (McDonald 
2002b and McKinley 2005). This is primarily because poor people started using 
rivers and stagnant ponds for drinking water.  
 
Little comprehensive empirical work has been undertaken on the practice of 
intergovernmental transfers and how this relates to the provision of basic services 
in post-1994 South Africa at the local government level. Yet the restructured 
transfers are increasingly becoming a crucial piece of a financial puzzle in the 
provision of basic services to the poor. Against this backdrop, this study uses 
Mogale City‟s experiences to explore in-depth the actual role of transfers in the 
delivery of basic services. A descriptive study of this nature is of particular 
relevance in a sense that it seeks to paint “a detailed picture”, as Neuman (2006: 
35) puts it, of how the restructuring of transfers has impacted on service delivery. 
Descriptive research “presents a picture of the specific details of a situation, social 
setting or relationship” (ibid). Neuman further states that descriptive research is 
concerned primarily with the “how” and “who” questions. As shown through 
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Mogale City‟s experiences, new knowledge or “a detailed picture”, as Neuman 
puts it, of how the practice of intergovernmental transfers in South Africa 
influences the provision of basic services is presented. The direct link between the 
two –restructuring of transfers and the provision of basic services – has not been 
studied with this level of attention to detail through the experience of a single site 
of local government.  
 
Methodology 
 
Research design 
 
The case study research design used in this study allowed me to take an in-depth 
look at the role transfers play in assisting Mogale City Local Municipality‟s 
ability to provide basic services. To gain knowledge of how Mogale City has 
handled the restructuring of intergovernmental transfers, two research methods 
were employed: in-depth interviews and document analysis. In relation to in-depth 
interviews, I interviewed key informants comprised of Mogale City‟s managers, 
councillors and political representatives, activists, a manager from West Rand 
District Municipality, and a manager from Rand Water. These participants in 
varying capacities are directly involved in the management of transfers; the 
creation, implementation and monitoring of indigent policy and free basic 
services; and the enforcement of credit controls. I also interviewed activists 
involved in struggles for basic services in the area to get a sense of the effects of 
indigent policy on the everyday lives of people in Mogale City, and their 
experiences and understandings of access to free basic services. For its part, 
content analysis served to combine both primary and secondary sources such as 
integrated development plans, indigent management policies and budget reports to 
elucidate how transfers have promoted, or blocked, access to basic services.  
 
Mogale City is one of the four municipalities that falls under the jurisdiction of 
West Rand District Municipality, which is located in the Gauteng province. 
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According to Community Survey 2007 from Statistics South Africa (as quoted in 
Mogale City, 2010: 16-17), the total population of Mogale City is estimated at 
319 614 persons. According to the working document entitled, “State of Local 
Government in South Africa: Overview Report”, Mogale City is regarded as a 
Category B1 local municipality (CoGTA 2009). A Category B1 municipality has 
a large budget and it contains a secondary city. This working document also states 
that Mogale City is rated as Classification 4 in terms of CoGTA‟s Municipal 
Spatial Classification System, meaning that it is one of the best performing local 
municipalities nationally. These municipalities are highly urbanised, possess large 
urban centres, and tend to be mining towns (ibid). 
 
In most instances, studies on service delivery either generalise or overlook the 
role transfers can and should play in the provision of, and access to, municipal 
basic services. Consequently, they fail to properly address in greater detail 
constraints municipalities face when it comes to the provision of basic services, 
on the one hand, and the facilitation of access of these services to the poor, on the 
other, despite the fact that these municipalities receive transfers.  
 
Gerring (2007) argues that a case study “may be understood as the intensive study 
of a single case where the purpose of that study is –at least in part – to shed light 
on a larger class of cases”. In the same vein, my case study uses Mogale City to 
understand how the restructured intergovernmental transfers have impacted on the 
provision of basic services at the local government level. Against this backdrop, 
the choice of the case study is appropriate in evaluating why even the relatively 
rich municipalities like Mogale City struggle to deliver basic services to those 
who need them the most, notwithstanding the flow of transfers to these lower 
spheres of government. Mogale City was selected because it possesses the 
functions and powers to provide basic services to the population within its 
municipal boundary. It is tasked with delivering all the free basic services 
including water, sanitation, electricity and refuse collection (Mogale City 2010). 
The municipality, most importantly, benefits from numerous grants and subsidies 
from other spheres of government. This study yields invaluable insight in its 
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assessment of Mogale City‟s capabilities to deliver free basic services given that it 
qualifies for transfers.  
 
Mogale City generates most of its income from own-revenue sources such as 
property taxes and user charges. Grants account for less than 20% of its total 
income. While Mogale City is not too dependent on grants and generates much of 
its own income, it is battling to keep up with the unquenchable demand for basic 
services in part as a result of pervasive informal settlements, rising unemployment 
and financially crippling non-payment of services, among other pressing factors 
(CoGTA 2009). By closely studying Mogale City, new insight into the post-
apartheid intergovernmental transfer reforms, as it relates to the delivery of basic 
services, emerges.  
 
Certain methodological considerations were taken to try to answer the research 
question. In this section, I provide details of qualitative methods, explain sampling 
technique, outline data analysis, and address ethical matters.  
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Qualitative research methods 
 
This study uses qualitative research methods as the means to gather the primary 
data. Qualitative methods refer to research about persons‟ lives, stories, 
behaviour, and organisational functioning, social movements or interactional 
relationships (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Pope and Mays (1995: 43) emphasise the 
benefit of understanding “social phenomena in natural” settings, and thus gaining 
insight into meanings, experiences, and views of all the participants. Both of these 
viewpoints suggest that qualitative methods lead to in-depth understanding of the 
subject under study. The qualitative technique employed in this study to collect 
primary data is an in-depth interview. In-depth interviewing is a qualitative 
research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a 
small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea or 
situation (Boyce and Neale, 2006: 3).  
 
Apart from in-depth interviews, document analysis is another research method 
used in this study. Data collected from sources such as newspaper archives and 
policy documents improve representativeness, adequacy, reliability and validity of 
interpretation (Mariampolski and Hughes 1978). To illustrate this point, document 
analysis avoids social desirability bias: a situation whereby a participant gives a 
response that is not necessarily true but appears socially acceptable. This makes 
information gathered from documents seem more accurate, valid and reliable than 
information obtained via interviews, or questionnaires.  
 
These two qualitative techniques – in-depth interviews and document analysis – 
complement one another. On the one hand, in-depth interviews honed in on the 
experiences in the utilisation of intergovernmental transfers and in the 
implementation of free basic services and indigent polices. Disparate experiences 
drawn from individual respondents would not readily reflect in documents. On the 
other hand, document analysis reduces the possibility of bias to which in-depth 
interviews are prone. For instance, the annual integrated development plans and 
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yearly budget reports yield reliable and valid data pertaining to free basic services, 
indigent management and transfers.  
 
Data collected for the study was analysed qualitatively. This involves analysing 
data by splitting it into themes so as to scrutinise how the government has 
restructured intergovernmental transfers since 1994, how free basic services are 
channelled through the indigent register, and what the impact of “non-payment of 
services” on the provision of free basic services is within the context of the 
restructure of transfers.  
 
Sampling 
 
The sample was made up of 34 interviewees. It consisted of 7 municipal 
managers, 10 councillors and politicians, and 15 activists predominantly from the 
South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the Umkhonto we 
Sizwe Veterans Association (MKVA) operating in Mogale City. These 
participants offered insight into the subsidisation of free basic services using 
transfers at the municipality and constraints in providing basic services. One 
manager from Rand Water, which supplies bulk water to Mogale City, and one 
executive manager from West Rand District Municipality, whose jurisdiction 
incorporates Mogale City, were also included in the sample. These two 
participants provide perspective on how Mogale City is coping with the changes 
in intergovernmental transfers and how these changes impact on the provision of, 
and access to, free basic services.  
 
This study uses non-probability sampling. Generally, this sampling technique 
means that a researcher rarely sets the sample size in advance and has limited 
knowledge about the population from which the sample is drawn (Neuman 2006). 
With regard to this research study, the non-probability sampling used is quota 
sampling. Quota sampling involves initially identifying relevant categories of 
people (ibid). Categories included 9 managers (seven from Mogale City, one from 
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Rand Water and one from West rand District Municipality); 10 councillors and 
politicians, who were chosen on the basis of their parties‟ representation on the 
municipality‟s council (seven from ANC and three from DA); and 15 activists.   
 
Ethical considerations 
 
All research participants for this study are over 18 years old. For ethical 
considerations, the data acquired from interview subjects is kept confidential in 
order to protect their identities as some information they may have revealed could 
potentially be sensitive. To hide their identities, respondents are referenced 
generically as, for example, Manager 1 or Activist 3. Subjects were given copies 
of the interview schedule, participant information sheet, consent form, and 
consent to record form. Ethics clearance was obtained from the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC Non-Medical) at the University of the Witwatersrand.  
 
Limitations of the study 
 
Attempts were made to secure an interview with a manager from Eskom. But the 
manager selected for this study was busy and the interview did not take place. The 
original target was 35 interviews and this number was reduced to 34. While 
Eskom would have provided another perspective into the funding and provision of 
free basic electricity in Kagiso, its input would have been limited to that. The 
main research question does not explore the provision of free basic electricity per 
se, but it looks primarily at the role of intergovernmental transfers in the provision 
of basic services.  
 
When choosing participants from the opposition parties, three councillors from 
the Democratic Alliance (DA) ended up being selected. Initially, the intention was 
to interview two DA councillors and one representative from the Freedom Front+ 
(FF+). It was difficult to set up an interview with a representative from the FF+ 
and the interview did not happen. Rather than having only two respondents from 
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the opposition parties, one more DA interviewee was added and this brought the 
number of DA participants to three. Both changes to the original plan – inability 
to secure an interview with Eskom and adding one more DA representative – had 
no material effect on the study‟s findings. There is sufficient data from which to 
draw conclusions about how the practice of intergovernmental transfers as seen 
through Mogale City. The enquiry into the restructuring of transfers implicated 
other levels of government, namely the national government, national government 
departments and Gauteng provincial government. But none of these potential 
participants were interviewed given the limited scope of this study.  
 
Archived documents from Mogale City were not available because the 
municipality does not keep this information in a central place. Archive material 
sits within relevant departments. Attempts to secure permission to access these 
proved to be fruitless as no one seemed to be responsible for giving such 
permission. Access to these documents was vital in, for instance, getting hold of 
minutes of discussions around the outsourcing of indigent management, capital 
project business plans and Eskom.  
 
Predominantly activists from SANCO and MKVA were included in this study. 
While these activists made their respective contributions to some areas of this 
study such as indigent management, free basic services and non-payment of 
services, they were less knowledgeable about intergovernmental transfers. They 
offered insight into the provision of, and access to, free basic services, but they 
did not know how the provision of these is financed. Nevertheless, activists cited 
in this study made an invaluable contribution to the themes around indigent 
management, free basic services and non-payment of services. That they did not 
say much about the restructured transfers has no effect on the findings.  
 
Chapter outline 
 
This research report is divided into four sections. Chapter two surveys literature, 
which looks at how intergovernmental transfer practices in South Africa have 
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transformed and what role they play in the provision of free basic services. As is 
shown, legislative changes have led to the redefinition of municipal boundaries in 
line with the transformation of South Africa‟s intergovernmental transfer system 
as far as the assignment of powers and functions at the local government level is 
concerned. With the influence of commodification, transfers are tailored to 
facilitate the provision of basic services. Chapter three explores some of the trends 
in the delivery of, and access to, basic services in Mogale City and looks closely 
at the transfers within the Mogale City context. Even though Mogale City is 
relatively well-off and generates much of its own income, transfers have failed to 
help it meet challenges posed by an increasing number of poor households, high 
rate of population growth, huge demand for basic services, and pervasive informal 
settlements (CoGTA 2009).  
 
Chapter four then focuses on Mogale City‟s attempt to decommodify basic 
services, and assesses how the municipality uses transfers to achieve equitability 
and how effective the local government transfer model is. In sum, transfers have 
fallen short of assisting Mogale City to reduce prices of basic services to 
affordable levels at the very least for the poor. While Mogale City has tried to 
make sure that those who cannot afford these get some level of minimum basic 
services, households that receive subsidised basic services still pay for them if 
they consume more than the minimum free basic service allocations, which are 
generally inadequate. Finally, chapter five addresses challenges posed by the 
implementation of an indigent policy and the pervasiveness of non-payment. 
Transfers are not only insufficient, but they also target a few poor people who are 
listed on the indigent register. These financial instruments also overlook non-
payment of services and illegal connections.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
 
The South African Constitution mandates local government to fulfil “basic needs” 
of their communities and to provide certain basic services like water and 
electricity (Reschovsky 2003, Whelan 2004). This implies that even poor citizens 
have the constitutional right to access these basic services regardless of whether 
they can afford them or not. In some municipalities the poor are denied this 
constitutional right (Gleick 1999, Reschovsky 2003, Bond 2008b and Tissington 
et al 2008 among others). As will be shown, this constitutional obligation seems 
to be in direct contradiction to commodification, which is prevailing in South 
Africa‟s local government. This chapter combines disparate primary and 
secondary sources of information to demonstrate how the intergovernmental 
transfer practises in South Africa, particularly, have impacted on the delivery of 
basic services at the local government level. In this chapter, the intergovernmental 
transfer trends within the international domain and South African context are 
dissected. It then conceptualises commodification in a separate section.  
 
Contextualising intergovernmental transfers 
 
The intergovernmental transfer is defined as the way to channel money from one 
level of government to another (see Shah 1994 and Bahl 2000 among others). 
Transfers mean different kinds of public financing instruments such as grants, 
shared taxes and subsidies. Most developing countries rely predominantly on 
transfers to supplement revenue available for lower levels of government to use in 
fulfilling their expenditure needs. In South Africa, equitable share is one example 
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of how the national revenue fund is allocated from the national government to 
provinces and municipalities. In the literature, transfers are conceptualised as 
public financial instruments that are deployed to make sure, at least theoretically, 
that a particular sphere of government‟s revenue generation is matched to its 
expenditure needs.  
 
When there is a mismatch between revenue-raising and expenditure commitments, 
the so-called fiscal gap opens up and transfers are required to close this fiscal gap. 
This fiscal gap means that a municipality, say, does not generate enough internal 
revenue from user charges and property taxes to help provide adequate services to 
its community. The fiscal gap creates “structural imbalances resulting in revenue 
shortfall, usually for a lower level government” due to inappropriate expenditure 
and tax assignment; limited or unproductive tax bases available to lower levels of 
government; regional tax competition; and level of national government taxation 
limits state and local revenue-raising potential (Shah 1994: 24-27). If internal 
revenue streams are insufficient, then grants and subsidies are needed as 
supplementary external sources of income.  
 
There are four key objectives of intergovernmental transfers. The first one is 
vertical balance or equalisation. These transfers are vertical because they flow 
from the central government at the top to other spheres of government at the 
bottom. Since lower spheres of government generally do not generate sufficient 
internal revenues to cover their expenditure needs and thus face a fiscal gap, 
transfers from the national government are necessary as they make up for the 
culminating fiscal gap. Lower levels of government have access to revenue raised 
at the national government level. To illustrate, even though value-added tax 
(VAT) is collected at municipalities like the City of Johannesburg and provinces 
such as the Western Cape, the revenue raised does not stay within their coffers, 
but it goes to the national government‟s. The national government shares this 
revenue with these spheres of government.  
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The other objective of intergovernmental transfers addressed in the literature is 
horizontal equalisation or interjurisdictional redistribution. These transfers 
equalise differences in “quantity and quality of public services” (Schroeder and 
Smoke 2003) within a particular region. Bahl (2000) puts it aptly when he states 
that richer regions tend to have more revenue raising powers because they have 
greater taxation capabilities and stronger administrative infrastructure. An implicit 
point is that poorer regions have less revenue-generating powers due to weaker 
taxation capabilities and administrative capacity. For poorer regions, transfers 
equalise fiscal differences so that they can deliver services that are on par with 
those provided in their richer counterparts.  
 
The third objective of intergovernmental transfers concerns spillovers or 
externalities. Simpson (2007: 2) defines an externality as a cost or a benefit 
imposed on people other than those who purchase or sell a good or a service. 
Adapting this definition to the public sector, one public entity incurs the costs or 
reaps the benefits of a particular service despite the fact that another public entity 
provides that service.  By way of an example, Eastern Cape might be reluctant to 
spend on education on the grounds that the students, once they have acquired 
skills and qualifications, may relocate to other provinces such as Gauteng. In this 
case, the benefit of education extends beyond Eastern Cape‟s borders. While it 
costs Eastern Cape money to support the education of its scholars, the province 
does not enjoy the benefits of this investment and other provinces such as 
Gauteng reap these fruits, even though they have made no contribution. The 
national government may consider compensating Eastern Cape in the form of 
transfers as the skills shortage is a matter of national importance. As Schroeder 
and Smoke (2003) note, the national government may consider transfers to lower 
levels of governments to fund services whose benefits extend beyond their 
borders.  
 
The last objective of intergovernmental transfer mentioned in the literature is 
administrative justification. To understand this objective, it is worthwhile to 
consult the literature on centralisation and decentralisation. Centralisation means 
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concentrating fiscal powers in the hands of the national government (Bahl and 
Linn 1994, Prud'homme 1994). One of the key arguments for centralisation is that 
the national government has far advanced abilities to administer taxation, a key 
source of revenue. In other words, it has well established administrative 
infrastructure that collects and monitors tax activities. The other pertinent 
argument for centralisation is that concentrating fiscal resources at the centre 
aligns the allocation of investment capital with the national growth policy 
framework. 
 
Decentralisation means the central government grants provinces and 
municipalities some fiscal autonomy (Bahl and Linn 1994, Prud'homme 1994).  
This is how Bahl and Linn (1994: 4) sum up arguments for decentralisation: 
“Consider first the notion that moving service provision closer to the people can 
lead to gains in the welfare of consumer-voters.” In short, municipalities can tailor 
their budgets to the local needs of their communities and improve efficiency of 
service delivery. They are in a better position than the central government is to 
respond to needs of the communities on the ground much quicker.  
 
Literature distinguished three ways of determining the total amount of resources 
to be distributed. Bahl (2000) states that one way of determining the resource pool 
is through shared tax pool. From the decentralisation viewpoint, the national 
government shares tax revenue collected nationally with lower spheres of 
government. Tax revenue such as VAT and capital gains tax is an exclusive 
preserve of the national government. Sharing tax has benefits for lower spheres of 
government in that it improves their fiscal planning, and boosts local fiscal 
autonomy if “conditions for funds are not imposed” (Bahl and Linn 1992: 436).  
 
From the point of view of local government autonomy, municipalities have 
leeway in how they spend their share of the tax pool if there are no conditions 
attached. In line with the decentralisation logic, subnational governments can 
prioritise which services are vital in their expenditure plans. If a municipality 
thinks that water is critical, it has free reign in prioritising this basic service even 
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though the national government may regard skills shortage as a matter of national 
priority. Some provide counterarguments highlighting the disadvantages of the 
decentralisation approach (Bahl and Linn, 1992: 437). Sharing national 
collections tends to be inflexible because it is politically difficult to change 
earmarked percentages.  
 
The resource pool is also determined in terms of ad hoc transfers. From the 
centralisation perspective, this means that the central government decides at an 
annual budget planning on the amount of transfers on a “discretionary basis” 
(Bahl, 2000:  6-7). Advocates of this approach argue that this gives central 
government flexibility in adapting budget to changing fiscal conditions. As 
Schroeder and Smoke (2003: 25) argue, central government acquires maximum 
flexibility to respond to evolving fiscal conditions. These motives for 
centralisation have drawn criticism. As Dillinger (1994) notes, leaving revenue-
raising powers in the hands of the national government discourages provincial and 
local government autonomy. Another criticism is that a municipality has to base 
its decisions pertaining to spending on basic services on revenue decisions taken 
at the national government level.  
 
The other way of determining the resources pool is cost reimbursement. Bahl 
(2000: 8) points out that the national government defines a service for which it 
guarantees to cover the costs incurred by lower spheres of government in 
delivering this service. This is another justification for centralisation. A national 
government focusing on attracting foreign direct investment often encourages 
lower spheres of government to adapt accordingly and to make sure they sing 
from the same investment hymn book, so to speak. For instance, the national 
government covers the costs if a municipality creates an industrial part for foreign 
parts suppliers in the automotive industry. The key criticism of cost 
reimbursement noted in the literature is that it can retard fiscal decentralisation in 
that the national government limits, if not closes, room for lower levels of 
government to decide on their local expenditure needs. 
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Intergovernmental transfers in South Africa 
 
In South Africa, the national government allocates part of its national revenue 
fund to three spheres of government – national departments, provinces and 
municipalities (Whelan 2004: 4). This allocation to three spheres of government 
aims to achieve vertical equalisation and it is called equitable share. As has been 
stated earlier, vertical equalisation is an attempt by the national government to 
address the fiscal gap created because revenues generated at provincial and 
municipal levels fall short of expenditure needs. The local government‟s share of 
allocation is called local government equitable share (LGES), while that going to 
provinces is referred to as provincial equitable share. The LGES plays a dominant 
role in funding the provision of basic services to poor households. Calfucoy et al 
(2009: 12) report that the equitable share accounts for an average of 56.7% of all 
national government transfers to municipal governments between fiscal years 
2003/04 and 2009/10. The local government equitable share finances a range of 
municipal functions and it ensures that “low income households in all municipal 
jurisdictions receive access to basic municipal services” (Department of 
Provincial and Local Government, as quoted in Calfucoy et al 2009). These basic 
services are electricity, water and sanitation, and refuse collection.  
 
The restructuring of intergovernmental transfers in the post-1994 period took 
place at two different levels. The first part of the changes to the intergovernmental 
transfer system concerns the redefinition of provincial and municipal boundaries. 
The second phase pertains to the restructuring of transfers in line with the 
adoption of commodification.  
 
The first stage was marked by the redrawing of jurisdictional boundaries of the 
provinces and municipalities. Against the backdrop of the past racial policies of 
segregation, this new demarcation of boundaries had far-reaching implications for 
the devolution of powers and responsibilities from the central government to the 
provinces and local governments in both previously black areas and traditionally 
white locations. Ahmad (1998) characterises the intergovernmental transfer 
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system during apartheid as a “dualism”. This means that the national government 
provided much of the transfers to black areas such as the Transkei, 
Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) states, at regional level, and black 
local authorities, at the local level. In 1990/91, the TBVC states generated 16% on 
average revenue from own sources and grants from the national government made 
up over 80% of revenues of the black local authorities (ibid). As far as black 
territories were concerned, centralisation became the norm because the central 
government provided much of the fiscal resources to them. By contrast, Ahmad 
notes that previously white areas were decentralised in that the central government 
gave them powers to maintain “fiscal and regulatory autonomy”. Black local 
authorities created in 1982 did not create effective tax bases, mainly because the 
apartheid government restricted economic activities in black communities.  
 
After 1994, the transfer system changed radically and “dualism” was eliminated. 
At the regional level, the government devolved powers and responsibilities to the 
nine provinces. The provinces were created after the dismantling of TBVC states 
and self-governing territories. The TBVC states included the homelands or 
“bantustans” of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei. These racially 
segregated black regions were integrated into formerly white provinces, Cape 
Province, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal. The 1996 Constitution gave all 
the newly created provinces autonomy (Bahl and Smoke, 2003: 4). It assigned 
them fiscal responsibilities including health care, education, social welfare and 
public transport. In 1993/94, provinces had about 22% share of the total public 
expenditure, but by 1995/96 this percentage had risen to around 40% (Ahmad, 
1998: 248). Even though provinces were granted autonomy with regard to 
expenditure, they were not given much leverage in revenue autonomy, and 
depended instead on grants from national government to overcome vertical 
imbalances (Ahmad, 1998: 249).  
 
At the provincial level, the centralisation of revenue-collection eases regional 
disparities in income and wealth, or what in the literature is referred to as 
horizontal fiscal disparities. This means that wealthier provinces like Gauteng, 
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which have a broader revenue base, share part of their proceeds collected 
nationally with poorer provinces such as the Eastern Cape, which possess limited 
revenue sources. Manuel (1998)
1
 noted in his comments on the Division of 
Revenue Bill that the equitable share formula recognised “economic disparities 
among the provinces”. He stated that the provincial equitable shares formula is 
designed to take into account disparities. For instance, some of the components of 
this formula include among others an education share and a health share (ibid). As 
Ahmad notes, the weak fiscal base of most provinces meant that they had vertical 
fiscal imbalances and horizontal fiscal disparities and therefore need grants from 
the central government.  
 
The redefinition of geographic jurisdiction extended to the local government 
sphere. Like provinces, municipalities were drawn anew by merging formerly 
black local authorities with formerly white ones. Historically, traditionally white 
municipalities were capable of financing a large part of their expenditures from 
own revenues. As the Financial and Fiscal Commission (1997: 3) points out, the 
demarcation of new municipal boundaries in 1995 combined former black, 
coloured, Indian and white areas. The 1996 Constitution and the 1998 Local 
Government Municipal Structures Act established three categories of 
municipalities – Category A, Category B and Category C. This legislation 
introduced changes in intergovernmental transfers at the local government level. 
On the one hand, municipalities have access to public financing instruments. For 
instance, the local government is entitled to equitable share of national revenue. 
They receive additional grants from the national departments, provinces and even 
district municipalities, where applicable. On the other hand, some municipalities 
were assigned expenditure responsibilities and given powers to provide services 
such as water, sanitation, electricity, roads, and storm water drainage. While 
municipalities can charge for services, there are variations in the revenue sources 
available to them. Category A and Category B municipalities have access to 
property tax, while the RSC (Regional Service Council) levy is available to 
Category A and Category C municipalities.  
                                                          
1
Trevor Manuel made this remark in his opening comments on the Division of Revenue Bill on 
May 20 1998, when he was finance minister.  
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The second stage of the reform of intergovernmental transfers was driven in part 
by commodification. Literature points out that basic services such as water are 
now regarded as commodities (Bond 1998, Bond 2008b, McDonald and Pape 
2002). In South Africa, the buying and selling of these services is mediated 
increasingly by prepaid metering.  
 
With the influence of commodification in South Africa, intergovernmental 
transfers now make up a relatively small share of the total revenue available to 
local governments (Reschovsky, 2003: 174). The Department of Finance cut in 
real terms the “intergovernmental grants” by 85% between 1991 and 1997 (Bond 
1998) and there were additional cuts of up to 55% between 1997 and 2000, further 
squeezing the ability of local governments to provide subsidised services to the 
poor (McDonald 2002b). Municipalities are expected to generate 90% of their 
revenue from own sources (Bahl and Smoke, 2003: 8). This suggests that 
municipalities operate on the basis of making a surplus in accordance with the 
commodification logic. For richer municipalities the 90% internal revenue target 
is potentially attainable, but for poorer local governments it is virtually out of 
reach.  
 
After 1994, former black local authorities continued to receive transfers to cover 
their expenditure needs. Some of these transfers were made to “R293 towns”. The 
R293 towns were local authorities that operated in former homelands. These were 
towns with little or no tax base and they lacked administrative capacity of their 
own (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 1997: 16). Other transfers to formerly 
black local authorities included funds for housing and external and internal bulk 
infrastructure like water and roads. Municipalities also received “guaranteed 
allocations” (Reschovsky 2003). But in 1997, transfers were consolidated into the 
Municipal Infrastructure Programme. This programme set the broader parameters 
for basic services that must either be subsidised or offered for free. 
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The Division of Revenue Act (DORA), which was first introduced in 1998, 
reflected the reformed intergovernmental transfers. This Act specifies and governs 
the local government equitable share and the provincial equitable share 
allocations, and conditional transfers from national departments to municipalities 
and from national department to provinces (Whelan 2004: 4). The DORA 
quantifies all the vertical and horizontal allocations to provinces and 
municipalities. Other forms of transfers are prevalent in South Africa and these 
include conditional grants because national departments and provinces set 
parameters regarding how these funds are spent. The national departments also 
make conditional transfers to provinces and municipalities.  
 
At the local government level, equitable share, which serves a critical role in the 
provision of basic services, fulfils two purposes. First, it addresses fiscal 
imbalance, the difference between expenditure requirements and revenue-raising 
capacity within a particular municipality. If there is “needs-capacity gap” 
(Reschovsky, 2003: 176), a local government is eligible for equitable share grants 
as this suggests that expenditure needs are greater than revenue-raising capacity. 
Second, equitable share reduces fiscal disparities. Fiscal disparities refer to 
“differences in fiscal conditions among local governments” (Reschovsky, 2003: 
177). Fiscally strong municipalities have tiny or negative needs-capacity gaps, 
whereas other municipalities have huge expenditure needs and limited sources of 
revenue.  
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Emerging trends characterising transfers in South Africa 
 
According to the “State of Local Government in South Africa: Overview Report”, 
transfers make up the second-largest source of revenue for municipalities, 
accounting for 22.4% of total operating revenue in 2007/08 (CoGTA 2009: 58). 
Transfers play a redistributive role and ensure that access to basic services is 
guaranteed even in poor areas. The term redistribution suggests that transfers‟ 
central role is to redress “the country‟s history of inequity and inequalities” (ibid). 
Post-1994, development and economic advancement are still concentrated in 
formerly white areas, while poverty is prevalent in previously black ones. In 
theory, transfers from the national government ensure that poor households in 
black locations receive a certain level of subsidised municipal services and hence 
redistribution is achieved. 
 
Transfers encounter myriad challenges, which have an effect on the provision of 
free basic services. The CoGTA points out in the working document that most 
municipalities fail to provide basis services due to an inadequate economic base, 
high levels of poverty and unemployment. Poverty and unemployment underscore 
challenges municipalities experience in debt collection, recovering outstanding 
consumer debts, grappling with high number of indigent households and dealing 
with the “culture of non-payment”. The term “non-payment”, within the context 
of local government, means that a household pays its municipal account 
“partially, occasionally, or never” (Booysen, 2001: 2).The definition of “culture” 
is not as clear cut and its meaning is contested. Sewell (1999) distinguishes 
between two meanings of culture. The first one explains culture as an “abstract 
analytical category” (Sewell 1999: 39). In this sense, culture is used in the 
academic field as an analytical tool to understand social life. Sewell also defines 
culture as a “concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices”. This 
“bounded” conception of culture suggests deriving meaning by differentiating one 
group of people from the other. Viewed from this context, for instance, the term 
“culture” of non-payment distinctly distinguishes blacks, who generally do not 
pay for municipal services, from whites, who tend to pay for these.  
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As a “bounded” concept, the “culture of non-payment” emerged during apartheid 
in the South African townships in the 1980s and proceeded into the 1990s. It 
continues under democratic rule long after the landmark 1994 democratic election. 
The term “culture of non-payment”, in its bounded form, manifests itself in two 
distinct ways and, therefore, carries different connotations in its use before and 
after the 1994 democratic elections. In the pre-1994 era, the culture of non-
payment symbolised black people‟s overt demonstration of resistance to apartheid 
rule and meant the payment boycotts of municipal services, rents and other tariffs. 
 
Even though non-payment of municipal services has persisted in the new political 
dispensation, its meaning has transformed. Non-payment does not indicate 
opposition to the new democratic rule. In the literature, two explanations are 
proposed for the persistence of non-payment in the post-apartheid period. One 
explanation for non-payment is related to affordability. With low income, the 
majority of black communities are indigent and thus cannot afford to pay for 
services. Officially in South Africa, indigent is defined as one who is “lacking the 
necessities of life” (DPLG 2005: 9). These necessities of life – which are 
enshrined in the South African Constitution – are sufficient water, basic 
sanitation, refuse removal, environmental health, basic energy, health care, 
housing, and food and clothing (ibid). Municipalities started establishing their 
framework for the identification and management of indigent households in 2001, 
and laid out procedures and guidelines for the subsidisation of basic services to 
indigent households. These municipalities must place each eligible indigent 
household on their respective indigent registers, which list poor households that 
qualify for free basic services.  
 
An alternative explanation for the culture of non-payment in the post-1994 
election period plays down the inability to pay for services, arguing that non-
payment is due to the “culture of entitlement” (Fjeldstad 2004). Entitlement 
connotes a “bounded” meaning of culture in that it is argued that blacks, rather 
than whites, feel they have the right to basic services on the grounds that they 
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helped overthrow apartheid rule and were denied services under apartheid. Apart 
from the “culture of non-payment”, most local municipalities report losses due to 
illegal connections of water and electricity, according to CoGTA‟s working 
document. All these factors contribute to the severe reduction in potential internal 
revenues available to municipalities and this negatively affects service delivery. 
As the working document notes, municipalities‟ spending plans wound up 
outstripping collectable revenues.  
 
Richer municipalities, metropolitan areas and secondary cities, face new 
challenges pertaining to transfers. CoGTA notes these relatively well-off 
municipalities are struggling to keep abreast with the pace with which demand for 
services such as water and electricity are growing.  Sprouting informal settlements 
illustrate the predicament confronting these highly urbanised municipalities. 
Informal settlements exert strain on municipalities to provide more services. 
There are an estimated 286 000 informal houses in Ekurhuleni, 260 000 in 
Johannesburg, 180 000 in Cape Town, 173 000 in eThekwini and 165 000 in 
Tshwane (ibid). The top-performing municipalities‟ inability to satisfy rising 
demand for municipal services has witnessed widespread service delivery 
protests. Municipal IQ (as quoted in CoGTA 2009: 12) argues that service 
delivery protests take place in municipalities where there is rapid population 
growth and high urbanisation rate and not in the poorest local governments.  
 
Other transfer-related challenges, which are worth mentioning and are well-
articulated in the CoGTA‟s document, include weak co-ordination between 
programmes; complicated coordination arrangements arising from the 
proliferation of indirect infrastructure transfers; weaken local democratic 
accountability resulting from transfers; weak programme design, implementation 
and evaluation procedures that limit the impact of grants on the development 
outcomes sought by government; and fragmented programmes to strengthen the 
capacity of municipalities.  
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Theoretical framework 
 
As has been pointed out, the state uses prepaid meter systems predominantly to 
commodify basic services in the post-1994 period. The term commodification 
refers to the buying and selling of goods and services in the marketplace in 
exchange for another commodity or money (Polanyi 1944, Watts 1999, and 
Williams 2002). Typically, sellers and buyers determine competitive prices in a 
marketplace. Before 1994, commodification, especially in the South African 
townships, was present under the apartheid government. The then government, for 
instance, reintroduced both leasehold and freehold tenure in black townships from 
1976 (Barchiesi 2006). As a signal of the deregulation of the black housing 
market, leasehold tenure meant the right to use property for a fixed period of time 
at a given price without transfer of ownership, and freehold tenure indicated that 
the state ceded property to individual black owners for an indefinite period, 
implying that this freehold title could be sold at a particular price in the market 
place. In both cases, tenure symbolised a commodity that could be traded for 
money at a certain price. The apartheid state also imposed rental, of which 
services such as water and electricity constituted a bigger proportion of the total 
“rent” (Chaskalson, Jochelson and Seekings, 1987). Rental also epitomised 
commodification in that users were required to pay for services. Commodification 
prompted black communities to “explicitly demand a form of rent control, and 
implicitly therefore demand public subsidisation” (ibid) as part of rent boycotts.  
 
In the post-apartheid South Africa, the state has taken commodification to another 
level. As the sole seller, the government provides all the basic services such as 
water to consumers, buyers. It has commodified municipal services like water and 
electricity by installing prepaid metering, which forces users to pay for services 
before using them. All households, with the exception of indigent people, pay the 
full price of basic services in a way that reflects full or nearly full costs of 
providing them. Prepaid meters were introduced at different times in three 
services: electricity, telephone and water (Ruiters 2005). Effectively, prepaid 
meters force users to pay for municipality services like water and electricity 
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before using them. The implication for this is that users only access services once 
these have been paid for in advance. Ruiters (2005: 14) points out that 
government has employed prepaid metering as it believes that this devise 
mediates access to free portions of basic services and helps users monitor their 
consumption of services or “self-regulate”. But McDonald and Pape (2002: 19) 
note that even though prepaid meters are seen as “the ultimate cost-recovery 
mechanism” and “require no overt punitive measures to ensure payment for 
services”, there are instances where these devices have been “tampered with” or 
“cheated” or “bypassed”. 
 
One of the underlying assumptions of commodification is that commodities are 
“private goods”. A private good has two distinguishing characteristics: it is 
rivalrous, implying that one‟s consumption of a good prevents others from 
accessing the same good, and it is excludable, suggesting that those who cannot 
pay for a good are denied access to it.  
 
Commodification is rooted in neoliberalism. Harvey (2005: 2) defines 
neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade”. In line with this neoliberal 
paradigm, state intervention in the market must be kept minimal, giving way to 
trade and financial liberalisation, fiscal discipline, deregulation, cost recovery and 
privatisation. Almost all states including South Africa have embraced 
neoliberalism (ibid).  
 
In the post-1994 South Africa, neoliberalism emerges under the guise of the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996. Under GEAR, South 
Africa embarked on legislative and policy changes that entrenched neoliberalism 
(McDonald and Pape 2002). At the local government level, neoliberalism 
transformed the manner in which municipal services were delivered (ibid). For 
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instance, the implementation of iGoli 2002
2
 in Johannesburg led to 
corporatisation, privatisation and cost recovery.  
 
Neoliberalism did not spring up with the adoption of GEAR. Its roots had already 
deepened well before 1994. The apartheid regime implemented some elements of 
neoliberalism in the late 1980s (Marais 2001). As part of the neoliberal reforms, it 
restricted state intervention, promoted privatisation, liberalisation and 
deregulation, and committed on fiscal tightening (ibid). In March 1993, the then 
government launched the Normative Economic Model (NEM), which attempted 
to align the economic policies it had implemented with what the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)had prescribed, according to Marais. The IMF‟s 
prescriptions are neatly summed up by term the “Washington Consensus”3. The 
Washington Consensus sought to encapsulate 10 neoliberal policies involving: 
fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reforms, competitive 
exchange rate, liberalising interest rates, trade liberalisation, investment 
liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, and property rights (Williamson 
2004).To a certain degree, these neoliberal reforms resonate through the new 
political dispensation. For instance, the democratic government has reordered its 
“public sector expenditure priorities”. This suggests that the democratic 
government puts emphasis on cutting intergovernmental transfers, encouraging 
cost-recovery and promoting the commodification of basic services. The motive 
for this is to keep the role of the state in the public sector to a minimum.  
 
There is extensive literature on commodification in South Africa (McDonald and 
Pape 2002, McDonald and Ruiters 2005, Bond 2004 and Bond 2008b). 
Commodification is seen as being instrumental in driving cost recovery, 
privatisation, commercialisation and corporatisation. Municipalities are 
increasingly required to rely on internal revenue sources and have to push for, to 
                                                          
2
 iGoli 2002 was a three-year blueprint developed by the City of Johannesburg in 1999 to aimed at 
transforming delivery and governance, restoring the City's financial health and creating the basic 
institutional foundations. This plan was prompted by the “financial and institutional crises” that 
confronted the City between 1995 and 1998 (City of Johannesburg 2002).  
3
 The term “Washington Consensus” was originally used in 1989 to describe ten neoliberal policy 
prescriptions that constituted a reform package promoted for developing countries by the IMF, 
World Bank and the US Treasury Department (Williamson 2005). 
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borrow a phrase from McDonald and Pape (2002: 23), “fuller cost recovery as a 
way to finance and expand service delivery” as they depend less and less on 
intergovernmental transfers. McDonald and Pape sum up the definition of cost 
recovery as the practice of charging the full or nearly full cost of providing 
services such as water and electricity.  
 
Cost recovery boils down to not providing public services like water for free or to 
eliminating exorbitant subsidies. One school of thought argues that charging for a 
service, and recovering costs of providing it, makes good fiscal sense for the 
government. Literature on “willingness to pay” aptly demonstrates this 
(Whittington, Lauria, Mu and Barron 1990, and World Bank 1994). This 
argument is premised on the notion that the poor are willing to pay for services, 
and cover the costs of service provision, because they are consciously aware that 
payment ensures sustainable provision of services in the future. The willingness to 
pay argument justifies commodification of basic services.  
 
Privatisation involves private entities (rather than public ones) in the delivery of 
services and it is vital for efficient functioning of the market mechanism. There 
are different forms of privatisation (Kirkpatrick et al, 2006: 146). Privatisation 
could involve signing a “service contract” with a private company to handle, for 
instance, indigent management; or take the form of “management contracts and 
leases for existing facilities”; or require private players to invest in facilities as 
part of “concessions”; or lead to the sale of part or all of a state asset through 
“divestitures”; or enable “greenfield investments” whereby an investment is made 
in an infrastructure that has not existed previously (ibid). 
 
Local government has operated in line with commercial principles neatly summed 
up as commercialisation. Commercialisation means a “process where markets are 
established for selected public sector goods and services in order to increase 
competitive pressures on suppliers” (Brown, Ryan and Parker, 2000: 207). Within 
the South African context, establishing markets means that municipalities sell 
services to users just like a private business sells any good or service to 
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consumers. A private business operates on the basis of one commercial principle: 
to make a profit. The commercialisation argument assumes that municipalities are 
run on a similar commercial principle: to make a surplus.  
 
Corporatisation has also transformed the way that local governments are 
managed. Corporatisation is a management model for running a government 
agency as if it were a business (Smith and Hanson, 2003: 1518). In South Africa, 
for example, Smith and Hanson note that corporatisation had led to the “internal 
reform of state-owned enterprises”. Under the City of Johannesburg‟s iGoli 2002, 
the City‟s agencies were corporatised. Johannesburg Water (Pty) Ltd, for one, 
became the city‟s water service provider. Each agency is ring-fenced. Ringfencing 
means isolating all the costs involved in running a given service. This means that 
agencies operate as financially independent entities with each responsible for 
recovering revenues from its own account holders (McDonald and Pape 2002: 
14).  
 
There are counterarguments that study the risks posed to the poor when 
commodification is employed in the delivery of basic services. A strand of 
literature looks at institutional shortcomings. In institutional economics, 
institutions are defined as “humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North 1990). Regulations, for instance, set rules and other 
restrictions that define parameters for human behaviour. Bond (2008b: 9) points 
out that municipalities are “captive regulators” in a sense that they are both 
shareholders and regulators. The City of Johannesburg is the sole shareholder in 
Johannesburg Metro Bus, yet it is also the regulator of this public transport utility. 
Bond argues that this can obscure accountability and service delivery. Generally, 
municipalities in developing countries including South Africa lack the capacity to 
regulate how the private sector players, when they have made investments in 
services, operate within their jurisdiction (Smith and Hanson, 2003: 1519). 
Municipal administration is problematic. In some cases, South Africa‟s 284 new 
municipalities have experienced severe difficulties managing services, especially 
in billing and collecting revenue (Ruiters, 2007: 488).  
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The private and public sectors are driven by a “different set of values” (Smith and 
Hanson, 2003: 1519). A private business aims for profit maximisation, while a 
municipality may be concerned with equitable delivery of basic services. Sunday 
Times (2001) argues in its editorial pages that in areas where water provision has 
been left in the hands of private enterprise, the infrastructure had improved. But, 
the weekly newspaper contends, service levels either dropped or prices increased 
when the said companies needed to maintain profit margins. This underlines the 
view that private players cannot deal with the equitable distribution of basic 
services. Paton (2003) affirms that private-sector companies are “not likely to 
solve „the poor people problem‟, where municipalities are faced with the 
challenge of extending the provision of services beyond the traditional white town 
into sprawling semirural surrounds”. She notes private companies can provide 
basic services such as water to formerly white areas along market lines because 
they are “guaranteed returns” on their investment. However, people in semirural 
areas do not pay for services, providing private companies a disincentive to invest. 
Driven by the profit motive, private companies involved in the delivery of 
services tend to “cherry pick” areas where “profit can be assured” (Smith and 
Hanson, 2003: 1519), neglecting locations that have no potential for a return on 
investment. The effect of employing market approaches like cost recovery in the 
provision of services is that areas that desperately need basic services are left 
behind.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Intergovernmental transfers are portrayed in this chapter as public financial 
instruments that, in theory at least, seek to eliminate regional disparities, and 
tackle inequities and inequalities. Against the backdrop of the restructuring of 
transfers in South Africa in the post-1994 era, there are questions as to whether 
these public financial instruments are fulfilling their supposed roles in helping 
municipalities, specifically, and provinces, in general, satisfy their expenditure 
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requirements. These expenditure demands carry much weight because they are 
enshrined in the Constitution, and different spheres of government are assigned 
responsibilities and obligations to deliver basic services. What is for certain, 
within the context of this research report, is that the nature of transfers has 
undergone transformation, firstly, with the redefinition of provincial and 
municipal boundaries and, secondly, due to the presence of commodification, 
which has turned natural resources such as water into commodities.  
 
These factors – redefinition of boundaries and commodification – have put a 
question mark on the effectiveness of transfers in facilitating the provision of 
“basic” services like water and electricity to poor communities, especially 
formerly black areas. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PROVISION OF FREE BASIC SERVICES IN 
MOGALE CITY 
 
Introduction 
 
As has been articulated, the contribution of intergovernmental transfers to the 
municipalities‟ income is historically diminished owing to the dominance of 
commodification at the local government level. With commodification in the 
pounding seat, the sale of basic services is inadvertently taking precedence. But 
this market-driven approach to service delivery has not only exacerbated 
inequalities and poverty, but it has also deprived the poor of their constitutional 
rights to essential services. As a secondary city, Mogale City generates enough 
income on its own to fulfil much of its expenditure needs, even though transfers 
account for a small share of its total budget. Some municipalities are 100% grant 
dependent (CoGTA 2009: 59). While Mogale City is not as dependent on grants, 
it is struggling to keep up with rising demand for basic services as informal 
settlements keep mushrooming sporadically, unemployment rises due mainly to 
closure of businesses and non-payment of services continues unabated within its 
boundaries. As this chapter shows, the demand for basic services in Mogale City 
is concentrated in rural areas, townships and informal settlements, which are 
previously disadvantaged areas.  
 
This chapter explores some of the trends in the delivery of, and access to, basic 
services against the backdrop of Mogale City‟s status as one of the highly rated 
municipalities in the country. It then assesses the provision of free basic services 
and the state of informal settlements in Mogale City. To provide context to the 
fiscal framework, this chapter then looks at the role of local government equitable 
share (LGES) in the financing of free basic services.  
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Mogale City as a Category B1 local municipality 
 
As has been pointed out earlier, Mogale City is regarded as a Category B1 local 
municipality, according to the working document entitled, “State of Local 
Government in South Africa: Overview Report” (CoGTA 2009). A Category B1 
municipality has a large budget and it contains a secondary city. This working 
document states that Mogale City is rated as Classification 4 in terms of CoGTA‟s 
Municipal Spatial Classification System, meaning that it is one of the best 
performing local municipalities nationally. The importance of Classification 4 
rating is that it indicates a municipality‟s capacity to roll out infrastructure; 
demonstrates its ability to raise revenue; suggests financial and management 
capacity in the municipality; and shows its ability to exercise sound governance 
and good management practices. Even though Mogale City is not as vulnerable as 
municipalities under Classification 1 and 2, it faces challenges that stem from an 
ever increasing number of poor households, increasing urbanisation rate and high 
rate of population growth (ibid). CoGTA also notes these relatively well-off 
municipalities are struggling to keep abreast with the pace with which demand for 
basic services such as water and electricity are growing. Sprouting informal 
settlements illustrate the predicament confronting these highly urbanised 
municipalities. As will be shown later, informal settlements exert strain on 
municipalities to provide more services.  
 
Despite its high-ranking status as one of the country‟s top-performing 
municipalities, Mogale City‟s main problem is related to basic service delivery 
(Gauteng Economic Development Agency, 2010: 19). The draft 2010/11 Mogale 
City Integrated Development Plan Review prepared by Mogale City (2010: 15) 
confirms that poverty in Mogale City is largely apparent in “landless rural farm 
workers, informal settlements and a large part of former black townships”. The 
population of Mogale City is growing at a fast pace. The Community Survey 2007 
from Statistics South Africa (as quoted in Mogale City, 2010: 16-17) estimates 
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that the total population of Mogale City is 319 614 persons, showing an increase 
of 29 927 persons from 289 714 persons count of the Census 2001. Mogale City 
affirms that its population growth suggests that the municipality has become an 
attractive city and thus more people immigrate to it. The 2007 Community Survey 
indicates that Mogale City has 51.48% male and 48.52% female members in the 
population. Mogale City has 50.16% employed people and unemployment stands 
at 20.76% (ibid).  
 
According to the draft report, approximately 50% of Mogale City‟s population 
earns between R801-R25 601 a month. The municipality does not specify how 
many people earn less than R2 160 per month. The R2 160-per-month income 
level is the current threshold set for households that qualify for indigent status. 
The draft report does state that about 55% of females and 30% of the male 
population do not earn any income. What these income levels suggest is that the 
majority of people living in Mogale City require an indigent subsidy in order to 
access basic services like water.  
 
Trends in the provision of free basic services in Mogale City 
 
To reinforce commodification, the South African government introduced a free 
basic services policy in 2001 (Tissington et al 2008). This policy specifies the 
basic services that are earmarked for a subsidy and, implicitly, endorses the partial 
or full pricing of basic services. The policy defines free basic services as water, 
electricity, sanitation and waste removal. At the national level, government has set 
the minimum levels of basic services. According to the Free Basic Water 
Implementation Strategy (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 2002), the 
basic level of water supply is defined as 25 litres per person per day or 6 000 litres 
per household per month. But some theorists (Gleick 1999 and Tissington et al 
2008) question if this free water allocation is sufficient. Some municipalities like 
the City of Johannesburg have increased the basic level of water supply, while 
others like Mogale City have stuck with the 6 000 litres per household per month 
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level. In Electricity Basic Services Support Tariff (Free Basic Electricity) Policy, 
the Department of Minerals and Energy (2003) set the allocation of free basic 
electricity at 50 kilowatt (kW). There are no national policies that define basic 
levels for sanitation and waste removal.  
 
According to the Municipal Structures Amendment Act of 2000, Mogale City has 
the functions and powers to provide bulk supply of water, electricity and sewage 
purification works and main sewage disposal, and solid waste disposal sites as far 
as basic services are concerned. This municipality also has powers and functions 
to perform other duties including integrated development planning, but these are 
of no relevance to this study. For Mogale City, the assignment of the functions 
and powers with regard to the four basic services means that it has the 
constitutional obligations and responsibilities to deliver these to its communities. 
As it notes, Mogale City (2010) delivers all the basic services namely water, 
sanitation, electricity and refuse collection, and it also provides certain levels of 
basic services for free to its eligible poor communities. As will be demonstrated in 
the following chapters, Mogale City is battling to fulfil its constitutional 
obligations and responsibilities, and this underscores the deprivation of basic 
services due to commodification and reduced transfers.  
 
It is vitally important to note that Mogale City supplies 6kl of free basic water per 
month to all its ratepayers living within its boundaries. This universal access to 
basic water is recognised in the Constitution and the White Paper on the National 
Water Policy for South Africa, according to DA Councillor 1 (December 14, 
2010). The 6kl allocation is offered to everyone who has an account with the 
municipality. Mogale City has attempted to remove the 6kl blanket access so that 
only indigent households benefit, but there was an outcry and motivations came in 
based on the Constitution that the municipality could not take away the free 
allocation to everyone (ibid). The municipality withdrew its attempt and then 
reinstituted the 6kl for everyone. Despite the initial failed attempt to eliminate the 
blanket 6kl allocation, Manager 3 points out that Mogale City is still looking at 
giving free basic water only to indigents (November 10, 2010). Given that the 
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municipality has to make a surplus from water distribution, it recoups the costs of 
providing free basic water to everyone through the tariff. Mogale City‟s tariff 
structure is discussed later. But Activist 7 argues that the universal 6kl allocation 
ensures that even the poor families that do not have R10 to buy prepaid water and 
are not listed on the indigent register have access to water (February 4, 2011). The 
price for prepaid water starts from R10 and yet some households are so poor that 
they cannot afford this amount (ibid).  
 
Within its jurisdiction, Mogale City sells or distributes electricity to areas such as 
Azaadville, Noordhewel, Munsieville, CBD (central business district) and the 
surrounding locations. Eskom also sells or distributes electricity to other parts of 
Mogale City like Kagiso and Rietvallei. Eskom is the state-owned supplier of 
electricity in South Africa. The parastatal generates about 95% of the electricity 
used in South Africa, and it transmits and distributes electricity to industrial, 
mining, commercial, agricultural and residential customers and redistributors 
(http://www.eskom.co.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=59). In Mogale City only 
indigent households receive 50kW of free electricity a month. The municipality 
provides free basic electricity to indigents in locations in which it operates. 
Explaining how indigents access free basic electricity, Manager 1 reports that 
indigents who are still on conventional meters get the 50kW subtracted from their 
monthly municipal accounts, while the prepaid electricity card is programmed to 
automatically allocate free electricity a month (November 10, 2010). But local 
activists, councillors and municipal executive managers alike complain that 
Eskom does not deliver free basic electricity to indigent households in areas under 
its direct control. What is supposed to happen is that the municipality should send 
a list of indigents to Eskom so that the company can provide free electricity to the 
relevant families. In turn, Eskom should bill the municipality to cover the costs of 
supplying free electricity to indigents.  
 
To cater for free basic sanitation, Mogale City provides one point per indigent 
household, and one point includes a toilet, sink and possibly a bath. With regards 
to refuse removal, Mogale City provides one 240-litrebin per indigent household 
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to fulfil its pledge to supply basic refuse removal and refuse is collected once a 
week. About 11% of the households use their own refuse removal, while 4% do 
not have a rubbish disposal facility (Mogale City Local Municipality 2010). 
 
Some studies show that free basic service allocations do not take into account 
both the number of members and dwelling units like shacks within a household 
and thus “unfairly discriminates against the large households with multi-unit 
dwellings” (Bond and Dugard, 2007: 9). For instance, a number of households in 
townships around Mogale City have backyard shacks. These shacks either house 
extended family members or are sub-let to other peoples who are generally 
working. Activist 1 observes that the indigent policy does not take into cognisance 
the number of members living within a household (February 4, 2011).Government 
assumes that the average household has eight members. In her founding affidavit 
in the landmark Phiri case, Lindiwe Mazibuko quotes the Coalition Against Water 
Privatisation‟s research report4, which found in 2004 that an average household 
consists of 16 members. This calculation of a household size includes backyard 
shacks, which are also widespread in Kagiso. Mazibuko further states in the 
founding affidavit: “Although the calculation is deemed to be 6 kilolitres per 
household per month, in practice, the allocation is 6 kilolitres per accountholder, 
which equates as 6 kilolitres per stand per month. The occupiers of backyard 
shacks are households that are unacknowledged by the City (of Johannesburg). 
They do not receive separate 6 kilolitre allocations and must rely on the main 
household on the stand‟s allocation.”  
 
The 6kl of free basic water is inadequate given that members are not working and 
are often at home (Activist 1, February 4, 2011).Even the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (2009: 37) states that the quantity of water made available 
under the free basic water policy has to be reviewed in the context of special 
health and hygiene requirements. It proposes that it is considering to increase the 
                                                          
4
The Coalition Against Water Privatisation (in partnership with the Anti-Privatisation Forum and 
Public Citizen) published a research report on the effects of prepaid meters in Phiri, Soweto, in 
which it found that the average household consisted of16 members (Coalition Against Water 
Privatisation et al 2004).  
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basic quantity of water provided free of charge to poor households from 25 litres 
to 50 litres per person per day.  
 
Two faces of informal settlements 
 
In informal settlements, Mogale City delivers some basic services. Two vastly 
different pictures are emerging of the provision of, and access to, basic services in 
squatter camps. Manager 2 (January 14, 2011) notes that the municipality 
provides bulk services to informal settlements – shared taps, shared toilet facilities 
and, in other instances, water tankers. The manager acknowledges that electricity 
presents a challenge in that the municipality cannot erect high-mast lights as some 
of the informal areas are not promulgated as formal settlements. Informal 
settlements such as Soul City, Pango, Tuder Shaft and Orient Hills have yet to be 
formalised. The municipality aims to formalise all these informal settlements by 
2014. Until formalisation, the municipality cannot provide formal structures such 
as roads and water pipes to these areas, implying that every basic service the 
people receive is communal.  
 
However, activists show a different face of basic services provision and access in 
informal settlements. Activist 2 cites a case where Mogale City provided 
communal toilets to Tuder Shaft, which is situated on top of the mine (February 4, 
2011). These toilets were damaged barely two weeks after they were built because 
of the sloping ground level. The municipality took time to react before it 
eventually set up plastic toilets, which are seldom cleaned. Tuder Shaft, he points 
out, has only two standpipes even though about 2 000 people live there (ibid). By 
contrast, Soul City, another informal settlement, is far better than Tuder Shaft is. 
Five people clean portable toilets, and there are a number of taps in the streets, 
according to this activist. The only basic service Soul City lacks is electricity. In 
addition, the activist remarks that refuse collection is a “disaster” in informal 
settlements, posing health hazards to the communities. Adding to views about 
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poor service provision in informal settlements, Activist 3 affirms that sometimes 
there is no water in standpipes (February 4, 2011).  
 
Contextualising equitable share within transfers flowing to 
Mogale City 
 
Mogale City receives both conditional and unconditional grants from other 
spheres of government to supplement its own-generated income. Transfers to 
municipalities aid in funding both capital and operating expenditures as figure 1 
below indicates. Officially, these grants assist the municipality render basic 
services to the poor community. With its heavy reliance on internally generated 
revenue, grants now account for less than 20% of Mogale City‟s total income. For 
the current financial year 2010/11, the local government equitable share (LGES) 
Mogale City got is at R170 million and the total grants, including equitable share, 
amount to around R300 million. Mogale City‟s total budget for the financial year 
2010/11 is at R1.4 billion. Manager 3 (November 10, 2010) sums up Mogale 
City‟s limited reliance on transfers succinctly: “I know that in some 
municipalities, you get equitable share as a major income source. But at Mogale 
City equitable share is not the major source of income.” 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the fiscal framework showing transfers to local government and own 
income 
 
Source: Department of Provincial and Local Government, “Framework for a Municipal Indigent 
Policy” 
 
The LGES, an unconditional grant, is the largest transfer Mogale City receives 
from the national government via the National Treasury. This grant allocation is 
in line with the constitutional prescription. Local government and provinces are 
entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally to enable them to 
provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to them (Republic of 
South Africa 1996). The National Treasury uses a fixed formula to calculate how 
much LGES each municipality must get annually.  
 
In the Division of Revenue Bill (DORA), the National Treasury (2010) states that 
the LGES formula has five elements. There is basic services (BS) component, 
development (D) component, institutional support (I) component, revenue-raising 
capacity correction (R), and correction and stabilisation factor (C). Of relevance to 
the delivery of basic services is the BS component. The National Treasury 
indicates that the BS component helps municipalities in providing basic services 
to poor households and with meeting municipal health service needs for all. For 
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each subsidised basic service there are two levels of support: a full subsidy for 
poor households that are connected to municipal services, and a partial subsidy for 
households that are not yet connected to the municipal networks, currently set at a 
third of the cost of the subsidy to serviced households (ibid).  
 
Mogale City largely utilises the LGES by offering each indigent household R86 
per month rebate on the basic service charges. These basic services include 6kl of 
water, 50kW of electricity, refuse removal and sanitation services. Stressing the 
significance of the LGES in subsidising indigents‟ free basic services and 
alleviating poverty, Manager 3 highlights the benefits of this grant thus 
(November 10, 2010):  
The equitable share is mainly intended to alleviate poverty and to assist 
mainly with the provision of free basic services. It goes mainly for 
indigents. This is the money we use to pay for the accounts of those 
people. It is sufficient to cover what we have written off. 
 
In Mogale City, the LGES is not only used to fund the provision of free basic 
services. It is also employed to furnish other operational expenses of the 
municipality. As has been pointed out, the I-component of the equitable share 
formula provides assistance in meeting some of the administrative and governance 
costs of municipalities (National Treasury 2010).  
 
Mogale City also receives a conditional grant called Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant (MIG). This grant is transferred by the Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs Department. The purpose of the MIG is to provide capital 
finance for basic services municipal infrastructure backlogs for poor households. 
The MIG formula is made up of the vertical division, which allocates resources to 
sectors or other priority areas; and the horizontal division which is based on a 
formula that takes account of poverty, backlogs, and municipal powers and 
functions (ibid). Put in simple terms, MIG funds capital projects. Mogale City 
(2009) wrote in its Budget Report that MIG amounted to R42.76 million for 
2009/10.  
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Mogale City also receives transfers of conditional grants from other national 
departments. These include among others the Energy Department‟s Integrated 
National Electrification Programme Grant, which seeks to reduce the backlogs of 
“unelectrified” households, schools and clinics; and the Water Affairs 
Department‟s Water Services Operating Subsidy Grant, whose purpose is to 
ensure effective, efficient and sustainable service delivery by all Water Services 
Authorities (WSA) (municipalities) and to subsidise water schemes owned and/or 
operated by the department or by other agencies on behalf of the department and 
transfer these schemes to local government. Gauteng province allocates 
conditional grants to Mogale City from its own financial resources. In its 2010 
Estimates of Provincial Expenditure, Gauteng province gave Mogale City R10.89 
million. Last but not least, Mogale City gets a share of transfers from West Rand 
District Municipality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the spotlight fell on the delivery of, and access to, basic services 
against the backdrop of Mogale City‟s status as one of the highly rated 
municipalities in the country. It also dwelt on the provision of free basic services 
to formal settlements and the state of the provision of basic services to informal 
settlements in Mogale City. To provide context to the fiscal framework, the 
chapter looked at the role of LGES in the financing of free basic services. While 
Mogale City has not depended heavily on grants, it is struggling to keep up with 
the rising demand for basic services due partly to informal settlements, high 
unemployment and non-payment of services. This rising demand highlights 
challenges posed by changes transfers have undergone, and the role these public 
financial instruments could and should play in overcoming the demand for basic 
services. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESTRUCTURED TRANSFERS AND PROVISION OF 
FREE BASIC SERVICES 
 
Introduction 
 
In the post-1994 period, policy-makers claim that intergovernmental transfers 
seek to remedy apartheid-era inequitable policies and exclusion from access to 
basic services alluded to earlier. Transfers make up the second-largest source of 
revenue for municipalities, accounting for 22.4% of total operating revenue in 
2007/08 (CoGTA 2009: 58). Policy-makers also postulate that transfers play a 
redistributive role and ensure that access to basic services is guaranteed even in 
poor ghettos. The term redistribution suggests that transfers‟ central role is to 
redress “the country‟s history of inequity and inequalities” (ibid). Post-1994, 
development and economic advancement are still concentrated in formerly white 
areas, while poverty is prevalent in previously black ones. In theory, transfers 
from the national government guarantee that poor households in black areas 
receive a certain level of subsidised municipal services and hence redistribution is 
achieved.  
 
Alas, transfers have encountered myriad challenges, which have an effect on the 
provision of free basic services. The CoGTA points out in its working document 
that while transfers have increased over the past few years most municipalities fail 
to provide basis services due to an inadequate economic base, and high levels of 
poverty and unemployment. Poverty and unemployment underscore challenges 
municipalities experience in keeping debt collection rates high, recovering 
outstanding consumer debts, grappling with high number of indigent households 
and dealing with the “culture of non-payment”. Worse still, most local 
municipalities, the working document states, report losses due to illegal 
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connections of water and electricity. All these factors – debt collection, 
outstanding debts, indigent households, “culture of non-payment” and distribution 
losses – contribute to the severe reduction in the potential internal revenue 
available to municipalities, while at the same time external income or transfers are 
low.  
 
Other transfer-related challenges, which are worth mentioning and are well-
articulated in the CoGTA‟s working document, include weak co-ordination 
between programmes; complicated coordination arrangements arising from the 
proliferation of indirect infrastructure transfers; frail local democratic 
accountability resulting from transfers; poor programme design, implementation 
and evaluation procedures that limit the impact of grants on the development 
outcomes sought by government; and fragmented programmes to strengthen the 
capacity of municipalities. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores Mogale 
City‟s decommodification attempts, transfers as the public finance instruments 
seeking to achieve equitability, and the local government transfer model, which 
places too much emphasis on cost recovery.  
 
Do transfers signal decommodification? 
 
Like other municipalities, Mogale City has commodified municipal services like 
water and electricity. It has priced basic services and has installed prepaid meters, 
which encourage if not force users to pay for services before using them. Even the 
conventional meters manifest themselves in commodification in that they 
reinforce the payment of municipal services. Both prepaid and conventional 
meters ensure that all households, with the exception of eligible indigent people, 
pay the full price of basic services in a way that reflects full or nearly full costs of 
providing them. Indigents pay once they have used more than the free basic 
service allocations. Unlike conventional meters though, prepaid meters are 
thought to be much more effective in entrenching the payment for basic services. 
Those who do not pay for services upfront disconnect themselves, while 
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municipalities sell services only to those who can pay. Prepaid metering is not just 
about enforcing payment, it also mediates market exchange between the seller – 
the municipality – and buyers, ratepayers.  
 
Within the context of commodification, municipal services have the 
characteristics of being private goods as has been pointed out in the second 
chapter. This has raised questions as to whether basic services should be regarded 
as public goods instead. Public goods are a complete opposite of private goods as 
they are non-rival and non-excludable. Examples of public goods include national 
defence. One person‟s access of national security does not diminish another‟s 
chance of receiving the same benefit (non-rival), and access does not require 
payment (non-excludable). The market model, as symbolised by 
commodification, assumes that people can afford municipal services. However, 
market failures or market imperfections are well documented (Stiglitz 1998, Stern 
1989 and Krueger 1990 to name a few).  
 
For instance, municipalities in South Africa are expected to generate 90% of their 
revenue from own sources (Bahl and Smoke, 2003: 8). This suggests that 
municipalities operate on the basis of becoming financially self-sustainable within 
the commodification framework. This commodification logic, however, has an 
inherent weakness if one takes into cognisance the regional disparities in income 
and wealth. In traditionally white suburbs users pay for basic services, as reflected 
in outstanding debt collection rates. Under these circumstances, the market 
approach makes perfect sense. But historically black residential places have a 
poor record of debt collection. For these communities, the principle stating that 
“you get what you pay for” (McDonald and Pape, 2002: 5), which is inspired by 
commodification, does not hold. For, when no payment is made on the part of 
poor black households, logically no selling takes place. One may infer from this 
lack of exchange that the market-driven model of delivering basic services is 
incapable of providing these services to needy communities.  
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Despite this weakness, South Africa‟s transfers at the municipal level have 
become a mechanism for funding free basic services to the poor (DPLG 2005). It 
is not clear if transfers signal some form of decommodification, which means 
removing the price from goods and services such as water and electricity. 
Decommodification emerges largely from “anti-neoliberal literature” (McDonald 
2002a). The motive behind decommodification is that there are alternative forms 
of production and delivery of goods and services to monetising the exchange and 
these include “the commons” and “shared cultural values” (ibid). The 
decommodification argument raises questions about the role of transfers in South 
Africa: who should qualify for free basic services, how far should 
decommodification go (should there be full or partial decommodification), what 
criteria are used to select those who are eligible, and which services require to be 
decommodified?  
 
Mogale City does provide partially subsidised basic services via the LGES. But 
this apparent partial decommodification only benefits households that are on the 
municipality‟s indigent register. Other consumers, whether they are destitute or 
not, are expected to pay the full price of basic services, implying 
commodification. As Manager 3 affirms, Mogale City operates on a commercial 
principle: to make a “surplus” (November 10, 2010). This commercial principle 
leaves little room for decommodification. It is worthwhile questioning if Mogale 
City has succeeded in commodifying services in the first place. An assessment of 
the performance of prepaid metering could yield valuable insights into 
commodification.  
 
Prepaid meters have made it easier for the municipality to price basic services and 
generate income. But prepaid meters are “dangerous” in that most municipalities 
do not normally monitor them (Manager 4, December 8, 2010). People bypass 
these meters. For municipalities, bypassing of meters represents a loss of potential 
revenue at a time when transfers are tiny as far as Mogale City is concerned, 
rendering prepaid meters ineffective. Yet cost recovery is said to be pro-poor as it 
provides the fiscal basis for further service improvements and expansion 
50 
 
(McDonald and Pape 2002). But a service delivery mechanism that heavily relies 
on prepaid meters, as an unreliable cost recovery tool, blunts the potential positive 
effects of decommodification. To illustrate, the loss of income weakens a 
municipality‟s fiscal basis to expand and improve services. This could have 
implications for the indigent management, roll-out of bulk municipal 
infrastructure and extension of free basic services.  
 
Financial constraints in rolling out prepaid meters also give a skewed picture 
pertaining to how effective commodification actually is. Without prepaid meters, 
and if conventional meters are used, both municipalities and households keep 
accumulating debt. With conventional meters, poor households cannot monitor 
their consumption and often wind up raking up debt piles, which eventually ends 
up in the municipality‟s books. Mogale City has some registered indigents who 
are not on prepaid meters. This is largely due to a combination of high 
infrastructural costs or layout costs associated with the installation of prepaid 
meters and the lack of grants from other spheres of government to assist 
municipalities in rolling out prepaid meters, according to Manager 3 (November 
10, 2010).  
 
Mogale City has designed its tariff structure to ensure that it entrenches 
commodification. In the literature, a tariff structure means as a “set of procedural 
rules used to determine the conditions of service and the monthly bills for water 
users in various categories or classes” (Boland and Whittington 2000, 2).The 
monthly expenses also include other municipal services like electricity and refuse 
collection. In the case of water tariffs, Mogale City applies progressive block 
tariffs in order to make the initial levels of consumption more affordable to, or 
even free for, the poor while charging higher prices as consumption rises (as 
figure 2 shows). This type of tariff ensures cross-subsidisation, meaning that the 
first block of consumption is subsidised by subsequent blocks as consumption 
increases. The basic assumption is that high water users such as affluent 
households and industries generate sufficient revenue from user charges to fund 
the initial block, effectively financing the provision of basic water to the poor.  
51 
 
 
On the advantages of progressive block tariffs, Calfucoy et al (2009) state that the 
benefits of the cross-subsidisation design are “the relatively low administrative 
costs and the avoidance of social stigma that poor people might receive through a 
targeted approach”. They argue that for this method to produce adequate revenue 
to finance the subsidised first block, the tariff charged to the higher blocks must 
exceed the average cost of water and enough people must consume at the higher 
rates to pay for the subsidies. Herald (2004) quotes the Department of Water 
Affairs as saying that cross-subsidisation works well in areas where there are 
sufficient high-income consumers in the highest tariff block, consuming too much 
water and covering the costs of providing free basic water in the lowest tariff 
block.  
 
Figure 2: Domestic water tariffs 2009/10 
 
Source: Mogale City Local Municipality  
 
On the surface, cross-subsidisation appears to represent another attempt on the 
part of municipalities to try to achieve decommodification of municipal services. 
52 
 
The price for the initial block of consumption is removed. But this free allocation 
is cross-subsidised as consumption rises beyond the 6kl mark and the average 
water consumption in Mogale City is 30kl per month, according to Manager 5 
(November 10, 2010). In rural areas in Mogale City, a few households use more 
than 15kl. Poor people spend R200-R300 a month on water if they use 15kl, the 
manager states. The 30kl a month equates to about 1 000 litres of water per day in 
a household and that is the average in Krugersdorp (ibid).  
 
In practice, however, using cross-subsidisation as the means to decommodify by 
offering the first 6kl for free is proving to be ineffective. Once households use 
more than 6kl, they start paying more for water and the price is reintroduced. 
Higher blocks of consumption become very expensive, the manager notes. 
Households in townships tend to consume more water not because they are 
wasteful, but simply because households consist of 16 members on average and 
tend to use more water. Therefore, poor households, whose budgets are 
“stretched” (Bond 2008b), bear the brunt of elevated water prices. For low-
income earners, higher prices either make water unaffordable to them or leave 
them with debt especially if they are on conventional meters. As for the 
municipality, it does not generate revenue if people cannot afford to buy water or 
it could end up sitting on ballooning debt due to defaults. Both of these scenarios 
do not bode well for cross-subsidisation because this model relies on rising 
consumption, which boosts prices, to fund the free basic allocation.   
 
Transfers making no dent on inequities and inequalities 
 
In the literature review, intergovernmental transfers are portrayed as public 
financial instruments that seek to achieve horizontal equalisation or 
interjurisdictional redistribution. It recognises that different local authorities, in 
the case of local government, possess different capabilities in raising-own revenue 
owing to their distinct income and wealth endowment. By way of illustration, the 
City of Johannesburg has diverse revenue sources that allow it to finance much of 
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its expenditure responsibilities. By contrast, Mogale City is not as well-endowed 
with revenue sources as Johannesburg is even though they are both located in the 
same province, Gauteng. But both municipalities are assigned responsibilities to 
provide basic services and to reduce a huge municipal infrastructure backlogs. 
Transfers are justified to ensure “equitable levels of service” (Financial and Fiscal 
Commission [FFC] 1997). Mogale City, for instance, uses the LGES to realise the 
“equitable” provision of assigned free basic services to the poor. Whether this 
subsidy attains equitable provision of essential services is a pertinent question to 
this study.  
 
South Africa‟s intergovernmental transfer system has been restructured to fit the 
requirements of commodification. As noted in the literature review, the 
Department of Finance cut in real terms the “intergovernmental grants” by 85% 
between 1991 and 1997 (Bond 1998) and there were additional cuts of up to 55% 
between 1997 and 2000, further squeezing the ability of local governments to 
provide subsidised services to the poor (McDonald 2002). Ostensibly, the 
restructuring of transfers has left municipalities with insufficient financial 
resources to achieve equitable provision of services. ANC Councillor 1 attests to 
the fact that the majority of 283 municipalities, including Mogale City, are just 
breaking even, which means that they neither make a surplus nor a deficit 
(January 14, 2011). Mogale City‟s insufficient capital budget underscores the 
extent to which expenditure requirements cannot be financed by what is generated 
internally, according to this respondent. Take Azaadville. It would cost Mogale 
City up to R50 million to upgrade the electricity infrastructure in Azaadville alone 
and this project has to be financed from the municipality‟s coffers (ibid). This 
suggests that transfers are hardly enough to assist municipalities like Mogale City 
fulfil their expenditure needs, including the provision of free basic services.  
 
Municipalities‟ reliance on their own financial resources, and the lack of adequate 
transfers, to fund some of the basic service infrastructure further limits their 
ability to deliver free basic services equitably. Enormous demand for basic 
services, particularly sanitation, in Mogale City makes this point clear. Figure 3, 
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below, depicts the expected demand for new access to sanitation services over a 
five-year timeframe. In the draft IDP review, it is stated that the performance of 
the municipality in relation to addressing the sanitation backlog stood at 15 558 
units as at the 2007/08 financial year, a meagre 1 050 units of the total backlog 
had been addressed, meaning that fewer than 200 units were provided with 
sanitation services each year.  
This continued under-budgeting for sanitation services will result in the 
failure by the municipality to meet the 2012 sanitation target. It is thus 
recommended that resources be channelled towards the provision of 
services in line with the set target as this is key to the creation of a caring 
society and the improvement of the health profile of the municipality 
(ibid).  
 
Figure 3:New access to sanitation services within minimum standards (n) 
 
Source:Mogale City Local Municipality 
 
The “channelling” of resources presupposes that Mogale City not only has to 
reprioritise its spending needs, but it implicitly also has to cut budget in some 
operations in order to discharge expenditure responsibility in other areas such as 
the delivery of basic services to its communities and the reduction of 
infrastructure backlog. In Draft 2010/11 Integrated Development Plan Review, 
Mogale City (2010) reports that it prioritises the provision of certain free basic 
services over others in the municipal planning and budgeting. Budget constraints 
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have had a knock-on effect on operational aspects of the municipality. For 
instance, there is a critical skills shortage, especially of artisans and technicians. 
In Krugersdorp there is one millwright. A millwright is a craftsman or tradesman 
engaged with the construction and maintenance of machinery. Mogale City has 10 
water pump stations and needs five or six millwrights, according to Manager 5 
(November 10, 2010). The municipality has contracted a private company to carry 
out some millwright jobs using its own funds.  
 
Ironically, investing in bulk infrastructure in previously black areas has not had 
many payoffs for municipalities in terms of broadening their revenue base and yet 
these locations require massive bulk infrastructure. This does not only mirror 
inadequate economic base, and high levels of poverty and unemployment in these 
areas. But it also demonstrates low debt collection rates, outstanding consumer 
debts, high number of indigent households and the culture of non-payment, which 
all characterise most townships. Manager 6 notes that investments in 
infrastructure in underdeveloped areas do not enhance revenue for the 
municipality (January 14, 2011). This manager argues that the municipality needs 
to put infrastructure where there is going to be businesses coming in. This 
argument implies that the development of infrastructure in formerly white 
locations is for investment purposes.  
 
White areas have high economic bases, low levels of poverty, excellent debt 
collection rates, and a small number of indigent households if any at all. For 
instance, Mogale City uses long-term loans to fund capital projects that generate 
money for the municipality and these borrowed funds are ploughed predominantly 
into formerly white areas (ibid). In accordance with the MFMA, a municipality 
may incur long-term debt for the purpose of capital expenditure on property, plant 
or equipment. Investing borrowed funds in capital projects that generate money 
for the municipality ensures that the municipality is able to service interest 
payments or payoff the debt.  
 
56 
 
As this manager points out: “You cannot go and get a loan to do something that 
will not assist you to increase your revenue base. We are always looking forward 
to increase our revenue base so that we offer services we want.” This makes good 
business sense for the municipality. But as far as the provision of basic services 
goes, this investment scenario means that black areas would likely continue to 
suffer from the vicious cycle: without optimum revenue base, they are unlikely to 
attract infrastructure that carries investment value, which in turn boosts revenue 
base. The implication for this is that inequities and inequalities remain in 
previously disadvantaged locations.  
 
Along with budget and investment constraints, Mogale City spends hefty financial 
resources of its own on the maintenance of infrastructure rather than erasing the 
infrastructure backlog and improving the provision of basic services equitably. 
The maintenance of infrastructure is not explicitly enshrined in the Constitution 
and, to compound matters, there are no transfers that cover infrastructure 
maintenance. Mogale City is erecting new infrastructure such as storm water 
drains, treatment plants and roads, but it does not even have the money to 
maintain this infrastructure, according to Manager 6 (January 14, 2011). Much of 
Mogale City‟s infrastructure was built 20-30 years ago and has far exceeded its 
productive life (ibid).  
 
Highlighting the infrastructure fetters, Manager 7 cites sewage that spills into 
Hartebeespoort Dam due to the ageing sanitation infrastructure and lack of 
capacity (January 6, 2011). If the municipality has an aging infrastructure that 
needs to be repaired, it has to budget accordingly, utilising its own financial 
resources. There is tremendous pressure on the municipality‟s resources and 
budget to maintain infrastructure, according to ANC Councillor 1 (January 14, 
2011) (see figure 4 below). In another case, DA Councillor 1 (December 14, 
2010) claims that Mogale City faces a critical situation concerning water whereby 
the municipality sometimes has no supply of water for three to four days. The DA 
councillor recites: “In September 2009, residents were without water for three to 
four days. In 2010, we landed up with a situation where some areas were without 
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water for seven days.” The interviewee also points out that a reservoir 
continuously pumps through water from the utility Rand Water and does not get a 
chance to fill up, indicating lack of capacity due to escalating demand.  
 
Figure 4: 2009/10 Budgeted Financial Performance: analysed by vote 
 
Source: Mogale City Local Municipality 
 
Counteracting arguments about ageing infrastructure, DA Councillor 2 blames 
poor town planning for chronic stresses on the municipal infrastructure and argues 
instead that there is a property development boom in Mogale City (December 3, 
2010). The bulk of the property development is in the northern suburbs. There are 
various other public housing projects that are going on in Mogale City and even 
though these projects are driven by Gauteng province, the municipality plays a 
role in approving these (ibid). Town planning is driven more by political 
consideration, according to the councillor. Councillors, who are in charge of 
planning, are vying for positions and endeavour to impress “powers that be” by 
adding ratepayers, who pay for services, and approving new development without 
due consideration of infrastructure capacity (ibid). Adding more ratepayers who 
draw on the same capacity negatively impacts on infrastructure. Two effluent 
treatment plants do not function properly, according to this councillor. A sewage 
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treatment plant like Percy Stewart is overflowing and releasing human waste into 
the streams, contaminating the drinking water.  
 
Agreeing with the view on improper planning, West Rand District Municipality 
(WRDM) Manager 1 points to an instance where people were allowed to occupy 
houses in the new Chief Mogale housing development and yet there was no 
electricity infrastructure (January 6, 2011). “Put infrastructure first and then move 
people in,” the manager argues. But Manager 7 (January 6, 2011) denies that the 
municipality approves developments when it knows that it does not have 
sufficient capacity and adds:  
First we check capacity that we have. Then if the capacity we have can be 
able to accommodate the proposed development, we are able to approve it. 
If we cannot, we will indicate to the developer that we are unable to 
approve the development at this point because the infrastructure is not 
sufficient.  
 
Besides these challenges, municipalities face fiscal dumping or what is called in 
the government circles “March spike”. Fiscal dumping takes place when upper 
spheres of government deposit transfers into the bank accounts of subnational 
governments without gazetting these transfers. This practice is illegal in term of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) and no level of government is 
supposed to move transfers without gazetting these, according to WRDM 
Manager 1 (January 6, 2011). In terms of the Act, a manager is bound to advise 
political office bearers to turn the dumped money to the National Treasury.  
 
But municipalities accept illegally deposited transfers from other spheres of 
government, according to this respondent. If a manager does not take this money, 
he or she is seen to be failing and the employment contract with the municipality 
does not get renewed. If a manager turns away this money, “you are 
disadvantaging yourself politically; professionally it is not good to let something 
like that go” (ibid). The inference one can draw from this is that there appear to be 
fault lines between political office bearers and municipal managers. Fiscal 
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dumping also manifests itself when the national government and provinces wire 
transfers shortly before their financial year ending in March. This is not explicitly 
illegal, according to a senior researcher at the FFC. In both instances national 
government and provinces engage in late transfers to avoid being seen to be 
underspending. For them there are two benefits for this: they do not have to return 
unspent money to the National Treasury as this money is not automatically rolled 
over to the following financial year; and they avoid the risk of having their budget 
cut as a result of underspending.  
 
But late transfers do not give municipalities sufficient time to spend the money 
and this leaves them at the risk of underspending themselves. The financial year 
end for municipalities is in June, not March. This partly explains why 
municipalities underspend: they receive grants and subsidies late. According to 
the FFC researcher, underspending affects capital projects more. When analysing 
the capital adjusted budget spending, 177 municipalities under spent to the 
amount of R7.3 billion (CoGTA 2009). This suggests that infrastructure plans are 
either scrapped or delayed altogether. As for the former point, if municipalities do 
not spend dumped money they have to return it to the National Treasury. This 
money could have potentially been used to build a reservoir or a power substation 
or a sewage treatment plant. In the latter sense, before a particular capital project 
commences, municipalities have to submit business plans to grant providers like 
provinces and national government departments, and they have to follow supply 
chain and other procurement processes to comply with tender requirements. If 
they get funding late, the capital project is more likely to be postponed. Manager 7 
(January 6, 2011) emphasises this point by drawing on Mogale City‟s experience:  
If money gets dumped in March, it takes three months to go through the 
procurement processes. By the time you are ready to utilise the money or 
to make appointments it is end of the financial year (in June) and we have 
not utilised this money.  
 
Fiscal dumping also depicts lack of intergovernmental cooperation between 
municipalities and other spheres of government. For instance, sometimes 
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government pays in R20 million on the last day of the financial year and it takes 
municipal officials up to two weeks to find out where this money came from, 
according to DA Councillor 1 (December 14, 2010). One can infer that 
municipalities and other spheres of government do not work cohesively and lack 
communication. Manager 7 (January 6, 2011) notes that when upper levels of 
government embark on adjustment budget, realising that they have not spent some 
money, “all of a sudden somebody wants a business plan from you” without prior 
communication between the parties. The budget adjustment allows for 
reassessment of financial priorities.  
 
However, some respondents argue that underspending at the local government 
level is indicative of lack of capacity to carry out capital projects from planning 
stages to completion. WRDM Manager 1 (January 6, 2011) insists that some 
municipalities do not have the capacity to prepare business plans. ANC Councillor 
1 (January 14, 2011) points out that underspending results from the combination 
of fiscal dumping and capital project planning. For the financial year 2010/11, 
Mogale City received R58.3 million from MIG; R1.3 million from the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs; and R8.6 million 
for Department of Water Affairs. It also received R5 million from an electricity 
programme; and R20 million from a neighbourhood development programme. 
The total is about R93 million from the state. But Mogale City has not yet 
received the above-mentioned transfer allocations, according to this ANC 
councillor, who was interviewed on January 14, 2011. Like other municipalities, 
Mogale City‟s financial year ends in June. The reason for this may be a question 
of project planning on the part of the municipality and availability of funding 
from the state. Mogale City is one of the few municipalities that have used its 
MIG funds in full (ibid). Mogale City is not only grappling with insufficient 
transfers. As the next sections shows, the actual model used to calculate transfer 
allocations to municipalities is problematic.  
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Resources are scarce: Flaws in funding model 
 
Internally generated revenue is often not enough to help municipalities fulfil their 
expenditure needs, creating a mismatch. In theory, when there is a mismatch 
between revenue-raising capability and expenditure commitments, the so-called 
fiscal gap opens up and transfers are required to close this fiscal gap. This fiscal 
gap means that a municipality does not generate enough internal revenue from 
rates and property taxes to help provide equitable basic services to its community. 
The fiscal gap creates “structural imbalances resulting in revenue shortfall, usually 
for a lower level government” as a result of inappropriate expenditure and tax 
assignment; limited or unproductive tax bases available to lower levels of 
government; regional tax competition; and level of national government taxation 
limits state and local revenue-raising potential (Shah 1994: 24-27). In most 
municipalities the fiscal gap remains even after transfers are factored in. Manager 
7 (January 6, 2011) explains the predicament facing municipalities succinctly:  
Contrary to popular belief that municipalities are corrupt and they do not 
have the technical know-how in terms of running municipalities along 
sound business principles, the reality is that the responsibilities do not 
match the resources. The responsibilities are huge, but the resources are 
extremely scarce. Can you imagine the rural municipalities that do not 
have any revenue base, but they still have to somehow collect and make 
sure that it is business as usual? I think the model is fundamentally flawed 
that municipalities have to generate their own income to be able to provide 
basic services.  
 
To appreciate the fiscal gap challenge better, it is fruitful to look at the formula 
used to calculate transfers to the local government sphere. A formula-based 
allocation of transfers seeks to equalise tax capacity and to reduce disparities in 
service provision across jurisdictions (FFC 1997: 21). Typically, factors used in 
developing a formula include: (i) indicators of tax capacity, the tax base of a 
single tax or a combination of taxes; (ii) indicators of need such as population, 
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land area, population density and the extent of roads; and (iii) indicators of tax 
effort, such as the ratio of tax collections to tax capacity (ibid).  
 
In South Africa, the formula employed in calculating the LGES and MIG are 
premised on two factors: income or revenue and population distribution. The 
population statistics are based on the data obtained from the 2001 Census. 
Basically, the formula for calculating transfers is limited and narrow, only taking 
into account population numbers while ignoring other critical issues like the 
topography of the area, and this often has a negative impact on the development 
programmes within municipalities (Shiceka 2010). ANC Councillor 1 (January 
14, 2011) argues that growth of informal settlements in Mogale City has been 
phenomenal over the past 10 years, yet this growth is not included in the 
population statistics. Such exclusion of a variable like informal settlement reflects 
the grading assigned to municipalities. Grading determines how much in transfers 
municipalities should get. The fewer the number of points, the lesser the 
requirement for funding there is. In terms of the current grading system, Mogale 
City is graded 4.  
 
Grading is based on the allocation of number of points for the total municipal 
income and for the total population. For instance, the number of points for the 
total municipal income in Mogale City is 33.33 as it earns between R200 million 
and R1.5 billion, according to the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act 
(Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2006). Mogale City‟s total 
population gives it a score of 33.33 points because it has a population of between 
250 001 and 550 000. The total number of points, which incorporate the 
municipal income and population scores, allocated to Mogale City‟s council grade 
the municipality at 4 as the number of total points amount to 50.01-66.67 (ibid). 
Grade 1 indicates the lowest number of points, whereas grade 6 signifies the 
highest number of points.  
 
Since 2001, Mogale City‟s population has grown enormously and its budget has 
risen to an extent that the municipality should be graded a level five municipality, 
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according to DA Councillor 1 (December 14, 2010). The formula is also 
inflexible. Manager 7 (January 6, 2011) points out that conditional grants, like 
MIG, are way too demanding on the municipalities, and the conditions are one-
size-fits-all and way too stringent. Municipalities can only use it for infrastructure 
and if they are unable to use it for infrastructure, it has to go back to the National 
Treasury. Smaller municipalities are struggling because they do not have the 
capacity to be able to meet all those conditions (ibid).  
 
The formula used in the MIG calculation is biased towards richer and bigger 
municipalities at the expense of smaller ones. CoGTA (2009: 41) points out in its 
working document that the amount of conditional grants allocated on a yearly 
basis to smaller municipalities is often too small for them to carry out larger bulk 
infrastructure projects. The document also states that the distribution of the 
equitable share favoured metropolitan municipalities over local municipalities. In 
2006/07, 40.7% of the total grant went to metros, 37.3% to local municipalities 
and 22.1% to the district municipalities and the bias towards the metros is a result 
of both their large and growing poor populations (ibid). But this bias proves the 
flawed nature of the local government transfer model.  
 
Municipalities are also dealing with unfunded mandates, which are taxing on their 
budgets, and this is not factored into the transfer formula. Unfunded mandates 
occur when national government or even provincial government impose 
“unfinanced obligation on lower tiers of government” (Zelinsky 1993). These 
mandates appear to have put strain on the fiscal capacity of municipalities, 
hampering their ability to provide equitable basic services. For instance, Dr 
Michael Sutcliffe, City Manager of eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, has 
noted that on average there was delivery of 16 000 houses per annum at the 
municipality (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2008). The administration costs of 
the housing programme within the municipality‟s boundaries represented an 
unfunded mandate for the municipality (ibid), given that housing is the core 
competency of provincial governments. The inference one can draw from this 
example is that eThekwini has to divert some of its financial resources, which 
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would otherwise help improve the provision of basic services, to the 
administrative costs emanating from the other sphere of government. In the 
tabling of the Draft Budget 2007/08, Helen Zille stated that Cape Town loses 
R500 million per year on unfunded mandates, functions that should be performed 
by provincial government, not local government. Unfunded mandates presuppose 
that some functions that happen at the local government have financial 
implications for municipalities. 
 
After 1994, there were a lot of unfunded mandates that were given to local 
government. Responsibilities, which previously were either the national or 
provincial government‟s, were transferred to the local government, states Manager 
7 (January 6, 2011). This interviewee illustrates her point in the following 
manner: “If you have a school within your area of jurisdiction, it generated traffic. 
All of a sudden you have to upgrade the roads and put in traffic signals to be able 
to accommodate the school much as the school is not your responsibility, but it is 
in your area of jurisdiction. In a way, such an unfunded mandate does have impact 
on the municipality. The same goes for hospitals and all the other services that are 
the core competence of other spheres of government.” The inability of transfers to 
plug in the fiscal gap and foot the unfunded mandate bill insinuate that most 
municipalities like Mogale City find it difficult to provide basic services and lay 
out municipal infrastructure without sufficient funding – be it from internal 
revenue and/or transfers.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Commodification assumes that all people can afford municipal services. The 
mantra – “you get what you pay for” – rules the roost. But this market-driven 
model of delivering basic service is incapable of ensuring the poor have access to 
the necessities of live. Attempts to decommodify basic services have proven futile 
thus far. This chapter focused on Mogale City‟s decommodification attempts, 
zooming in on the LGES as a subsidy that tries to remove part of the price for 
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basic services and cross-subsidisation, which allows for subsidy on an initial level 
of consumption and depends on higher usage to fund the free provision. There is 
no equitable allocation of basic services.  
 
The South African intergovernmental transfer system has been restructured to fit 
the requirements of commodification. The restructuring has left municipalities 
with insufficient financial resources to achieve equitable provision of services. 
Their own financial resources are hardy enough to assist them fund some of the 
basic service infrastructure, further limiting their abilities to deliver services 
equitably. As has been noted, the local government transfer model is flawed. The 
fixed formula used to calculate grants is premised on two factors: income or 
revenue and outdated population statistics. The formula also favours richer 
municipalities over their poorer cousins. Municipalities are also dealing with 
unfunded mandates, which are not factored into transfer formula.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS, INDIGENT 
POLICY AND NON-PAYMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1994, the country inherited a situation where many people were just 
treated as hewers of wood and drawers of water. For you to rectify that 
process, you need to identify who these hewers of wood and drawers of 
water are as set by the previous government. It is through the indigent 
registration that you are able to identify these people. So that when 
opportunities arrive you know where to align them to. Somebody once 
said to me: „During the apartheid year, all black people were put into a 
well of economic oblivion. Come 1994, those who were politically 
connected were the first to get out of the well. When they threw ropes 
down, they only threw short ropes – where their friends, families and 
relatives were able to move out of the well. When they came out, they 
never threw the ropes down because there are so many people at the 
bottom.‟ Those who are at the bottom are those we are talking about today, 
who are indigents. They do not have access to these free basic services 
(DA Councillor 3, December 14, 2010). 
 
In 2007, about 5.7 million South African households did not have universal access 
to water, sanitation, refuse removal and electricity, according to the Delivery 
Agreement for Outcome 9 (Republic of South Africa 2010). Faced with this 
daunting challenge, the government has set ambitious targets to ensure that those 
who “were put into a well of economic oblivion”, as the quote points out, have 
universal access to basic services. In its Delivery Agreement, the government 
states that it seeks to improve universal access to basic services by 2014 and has 
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set the following targets: water from 92% to 100%, sanitation from 69% to 100%, 
refuse removal from 64% to 75%, and electricity from 81% to 92%. Insufficient 
transfers, to a greater degree, and inadequate internal income, to a lesser extent, 
may prove to be a hindrance in the government‟s latest drive to improve universal 
access to basic services.  
 
The bulk infrastructure backlogs make a telling reading. Presently, grants such as 
the MIG are limited to tackling the extreme numbers for existing backlogs, 
according to the Delivery Agreement for Outcome 9. But paying attention to the 
existing backlogs grossly overlooks the new infrastructure requirement due 
chiefly to “a growing population and a growing economy” and the lack of 
infrastructure in rural areas and informal settlements in urban areas (ibid). The 
critical question, which sets the tone for this chapter, is whether transfers do 
facilitate the provision of free basic services to those who are at “the bottom”?  
 
Indigent policy: Exclusion, stigmatisation and abuses 
 
The national government has restructured transfers purposefully to link grants 
such as local government equitable share directly to certain chosen poor people. 
Eligible needy households only benefit by receiving subsidised free basic 
services. To put this approach into practice, the state designed the indigent policy 
to serve as the conduit through which the poor access free basic services. As the 
draft Municipal Infrastructure Support Strategy (DPLG 2007: 6) points out, 
municipalities should register eligible beneficiaries in their respective indigent 
registers in order to enable the monitoring of the performance of the social 
programmes such as the free basic services. As has been stated earlier, indigent is 
defined as “lacking the necessities of life” (DPLG 2005). These necessities of life 
are sufficient water, basic sanitation, refuse removal in denser settlements, 
environmental health, basic energy, health care, housing, and food and clothing. 
Mogale City has an indigent policy whose objectives seek to bring relief to those 
who “lack the necessities of life”. It has established the framework for the 
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identification and management of indigent households, and laid out procedures 
and guidelines for the subsidisation of basic services to indigent households.  
 
In conjunction with indigent policy, the national government created the 
Municipal Investment Infrastructure Framework (MIIF) of 1997, which set the 
broader parameters for basic services that must either be subsidised or offered for 
free. The guiding principle of this framework, to quote McDonald and Pape 
(2002: 5), is: “you get what you pay for”. This means that users of municipal 
services are required to pay for these whether they are rich or poor. Those who 
cannot afford services and, are on an indigent register, have access to the basic 
provisions. In Mogale City, these basic provisions do help the needy. Indigents in 
this municipality include pensioners, unemployed people and child-headed 
families, where the main caregiver of a household is younger than 18 years 
(Mogale City 2009).  
 
To qualify as an indigent in Mogale City, a household must earn a combined gross 
income equivalent to or less than two government pension grants, which currently 
equate to R2 160 per month. Any other government grant such as the child 
support grant is not considered an additional income. But income from other 
sources like property rental disqualifies an applicant if it increases the gross 
income to more than R2 160. Apart from this income threshold, a person who 
claims indigent status must also be a resident of Mogale City; be in possession of 
a valid South African identity document; be the owner or tenant who receives 
municipal services; and have an active municipal account. The applicant must 
consent to the installation of prepaid meters as a means to limit the consumption 
of services and to abate the accumulation of debt. On approval, the municipality 
cancels outstanding municipal debts of qualifying indigents, but any subsequent 
accumulation of debt after approval is not scrapped. Once approved, each indigent 
household receives free basic services, which are explained in-depth in the third 
chapter. These households are entitled to use the limited allocation a month. For 
water, if they use more than 6kl, then they have to pay the excess and for 
electricity if they use more than 60kW, they have to pay for extra consumption.  
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In its Indigent Management Policy, Mogale City notes that an Indigent Committee 
approves or disapproves indigent support to applicants. This committee comprises 
councillors and relevant officials of the municipality. The committee meets at 
least once a month. As part of the indigent management process, indigents on the 
register will be reviewed after two years. During the review process, site visits are 
performed to determine if the said registered indigents still qualify. Mogale City 
has outsourced indigent management to an independent company. This service 
provider, which enters a four-year contract with the municipality, assists with the 
management of indigents, verifies applications and recommends that an applicant 
is either suitable or not for approval to receive indigent support. In their wards, 
councillors are involved in the indigent management process. They make sure that 
people get relevant information about the benefits of indigent policy and give 
them pamphlets and leaflets, according to ANC Councillor 4 (November 26, 
2010). They also run door-to-door campaigns to check if people are registered 
because sometimes people are not informed and not all of the people attend ward 
meetings and constituency meetings, where indigent matters feature prominently, 
notes ANC Councillor 2 (December 3, 2010). In addition, councillors work with 
municipal officials, social workers, service providers, and managers of the 
community services from the municipality.   
 
But activists maintain that there is a disconnectedness between councillors and 
their communities. Activist 6 (February 5, 2011) stresses that councillors are not 
visible to the people. Immediately after getting voted, they disappear from the 
ground. Activist 2 (February 4, 2011) concurs and claims that some councillors do 
not arrange meetings to make sure communities are informed about the indigent 
policy, adding that it is “something they always discuss at the town hall. But on 
the ground level, it is difficult to get this kind of information”. The interviewee 
goes a step further, pointing out that councillors have the tendency to call 
meetings and specify that a certain political organisation is inviting community 
members to that meeting. Some people do not attend such meetings because they 
have not voted for councillors from a political party in question (ibid). The 
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CoGTA (2009) details the paralysis inhibiting the effectiveness and functionality 
of ward committees in municipalities across the country. Many councillors do not 
attend ward committee meetings, some committees are poorly resourced and do 
not meet expectations, and ward committee issues often do not find their way into 
municipal councils‟ meetings (ibid).  
 
During apartheid, the inequitable policies resulted in “exclusion from access to 
basic services by the poor” (DPLG 2005). Back then this exclusion was motivated 
by racial discrimination. In the new political dispensation policies, notably 
indigent policy, also serve as the barrier to access to basic services. This form of 
exclusion is driven by the permeation of commodification in the delivery of basic 
services. A poor person who is not on an indigent register has no access to free 
basic services (Tissington et al 2008 and Wafer et al 2008).  
 
As one of the qualification criteria, Mogale City requires indigent applicants to 
have an active municipal account. If poor households are not registered through 
the indigent programmes, they do not receive free basic services. People living in 
informal settlements, for instance, do not have the proof of municipal accounts. 
Foreign nationals are not in possession of the South African identity document. 
Tenants, who are unregistered occupants of a property owned by a legal owner, 
also cannot register as indigents. The municipality does provide basic services to 
some of the excluded in informal settlements via standpipes, water tankers and 
potable toilets. But this does not mean that the beneficiaries of these common 
basic services are indigent as they have not been assessed in terms of the 
qualification criteria and indigent policy.  
 
Another excluded category is what Reschovsky (2003) refers to as the “near-
poor”, who are relatively destitute but do not qualify for free basic services. This 
group of people fall outside the income threshold needed to qualify for indigent 
assistance. Yet “near-poor” households have insufficient money to pay for basic 
services and many local governments have inadequate revenue-raising capacity to 
generate sufficient funds to finance the provision of basic services to the “near-
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poor”. In Mogale City there is a heated debate around the income threshold. As 
has been pointed out, the upper income limit in Mogale City is two government 
pension grants or R2 160. There has been a proposal to increase the threshold, but 
it was rejected and there has been a recommendation to target certain poor areas 
and offer blanket approval, but this was dismissed too (Manager 2, January 14, 
2011). 
 
The indigent policy faces numerous administrative challenges. Indigents have to 
reapply as part of the re-evaluation process that occurs every two years. During 
re-evaluation, Mogale City‟s system should generate a list of site visits to be 
performed of the registered indigents, and assign these to a verification officer, 
according to Mogale City‟s Indigent Management Policy. This policy further 
states that the Indigent Management System must evaluate each visit the same as 
a new application and any changes must be noted when being re-submitted to the 
Indigent Committee. This re-evaluation creates unnecessary red tape and 
backlogs, according to DA Councillor 2 (December 3, 2010). Manager 2 (January 
14, 2011) highlights the difficulty posed by the backlog. Mogale City did not have 
the new indigent management service provider for a year after electing to choose a 
new one rather than renew the existing contract. This means that during this one-
year period there were indigent registrations, but there was no verification and 
marketing of the programme (ibid).  
 
Mogale City employs two staff members, who assist walk-in indigent applicants. 
These workers cover the entire population of Mogale City and they are stationed 
in the municipality‟s Masakhane council building. Masakhane is Mogale City‟s 
official indigent office. The new service provider has almost finished cleaning up 
the indigent register and dealing with indigent households that are due for re-
evaluation, according to Manager 2 (January 14, 2011). From July 2010 to 
December 2010, the new service provider processed 1 914 on the indigent register 
of the total of 4 832 (ibid). The company is now working on the marketing and 
communication strategy to try reach out to the poor, the participant notes.  
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Administrative problems related to the municipal billing systems are well-
documented (Bond 2008b, Ruiters 2007, and Bond and Dugard 2007). Billing is a 
way of informing ratepayers how much they owe in rates and service charges. In a 
news feature entitled “Not all is gold” that exposes billing travails in most 
municipalities, Naidoo (2011) reports that Johannesburg residents and businesses 
may be affected by “exorbitant, incorrect billing”. It seems that the billing 
troubles are not only affecting consumers, but also affecting the indigent 
management. According to some activists, approved indigents receive statements 
that reflect old balances and their bills do not reflect rebates and they therefore 
have to pay for services in full.  
 
Dysfunctional billing systems reflect incompatible IT systems. Manager 2 
(January 14, 2011) notes that different departments – involving financial services, 
social services and infrastructure – have their own conflicting indigent figures and 
“we are not speaking from the same page”. One department says the number of 
indigents is plus or minus 3 000, while the other indicates that the number is close 
to 7 500. This suggests that departments use incompatible IT systems to capture 
registered indigents. Even the services provider is not linked to the municipality‟s 
IT systems. The new service provider does not know how many new indigent 
registrations have taken place. There are other administrative problems around the 
implementation of the indigent policy, with beneficiaries not being informed of 
their status and delays in implementation (Mc Michael, 2008: 55). For instance, 
Activist 4 (February 4, 2011) points out that indigent applicants are not captured 
on the data system. The very same people who have submitted applications will 
receive letters from lawyers to demand payment.  
 
The indigent management process in Mogale City is centralised. This means that 
the registration and processing of indigent applications are handled at the 
municipality‟s headquarters in Krugersdorp. Executive managers insist that the 
municipality has no capacity to administer the indigent management and requires 
a private company to boost capacity, justifying outsourcing the indigent 
management. Centralisation implies that people have one office as the point of 
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contact. For the poorest of the poor, the central office in Krugersdorp may require 
transport, which is a cost. However, activists argue that the indigent management 
should be decentralised. Activist 5 (February 4, 2011) recommends that 
decentralisation takes the indigent process to the communities. There are 
community structures such as ward committees, community liaison officers and 
community development workers which can be harnessed to handle registrations 
(ibid). DA Councillor 3 (December 14, 2010) posits that the private company 
might not have the passion to fully administer the whole indigent management 
process and may only be interested in reaching targets, which determines income. 
This suggests that the private company may be motivated to earn income from its 
indigent management service, rather than genuinely helping the poor gain access 
to free basic services.  
 
Indigent policy is open to abuse. “Sometimes councillors bring in people who do 
not qualify for indigent benefits maybe to get their votes”, according to Manager 3 
(November 10, 2010). “There was one councillor who was caught out when he 
became a councillor and only to find that this councillor was on an indigent 
register,” notes DA Councillor 3 (December 14, 2010). “Now there are the free-
riders, professionals who live with their pensioned parents, and they hide behind 
their parents and seek to benefit from free basic services when their parents apply 
for indigency” (ANC Councillor 2, December 3, 2010). “Other people do not fully 
disclose documents that are required of them” (ANC Councillor 3, December 14, 
2010).  
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Culture of non-payment: The “politicisation” of payment of 
services 
 
As an external funding source, transfers have failed to help most municipalities 
fulfil their expenditure needs and make good on their constitutional 
responsibilities for two reasons, which are outlined above. But municipalities face 
another conundrum that is largely within their direct control: insufficient 
internally generated revenue due primarily to the “culture of non-payment”. As 
has been noted, the culture of non-payment emerged during apartheid and 
continues under democratic rule after 1994. Non-payment of services implicates 
municipalities across the board. In a news article entitled “Money owed to 
municipally coffers now tops R62bn”, Pressly (2010) reports that municipalities 
countrywide were owed a total of R62.3 billion and of this total household rate 
and service charge debts accounted for close to R38 billion as of September 2010. 
Mogale City debt is now nearly R700 million. The non-payment of services is 
mostly evident in black townships, while white and Indian communities pay 
consistently well for their services. Within certain sections in the townships, debt 
collection rates are as low as 14% to 32% (DA Councillor 2, December 3, 2011):   
We have got people that are constantly paying. We have the south and the 
north. The north is mostly suburbs. In the suburbs, most of the people are 
paying. We have got Azaadville, the Indian area. It is always 99% debt 
collection rate. Every time we go to the people, we show them the pattern 
of payment. Every time, it will be three areas – Munsieville, Kagiso and 
Swanneville – that are not paying well. In those areas, they normally pay 
less than 50%. 
 
The non-payment of services affects debt collection and will also affect a 
municipality‟s ability in terms of available money to provide services. The culture 
of non-payment is even leading to cash flow problems within the council and has 
hampered service delivery (Mogale City Local Municipality 2008). To illustrate, 
Mogale City buys bulk water and bulk electricity from Rand Water and Eskom, 
respectively. It then sells these services to its consumers including households and 
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businesses. The income Mogale City generates from selling water and electricity 
tends to be less than the money it spends on bulk purchases from Eskom and Rand 
Water. To put bulk service debt into perspective in the local government sphere, 
Pressly (2010) writes that the outstanding debt related to water stood at R17.5 
billion, while the electricity debt is lesser at R10.6 billion. Generally people who 
tend to struggle to pay for their services are pensioners, unemployed persons and 
low-income earners, according to respondents.  Some registered indigents, who 
are using conventional meters, struggle to pay because they cannot monitor their 
water or electricity consumption, incurring debt. Those who do not pay for 
services also include middle-class households. One finds professionals such as 
nurses, teachers and government employees not paying for services. Apart from 
household consumers, private companies and government entities are implicated 
in the non-payment of service.  
 
As indicated earlier, the term “culture of non-payment” manifests itself in two 
distinct forms and, therefore, carries different connotations in its use before and 
after the 1994 democratic elections. The concept “culture” is understood within 
the context of this study, to borrow from Sewell (1999), as a “bounded” term. In 
the pre-1994 era, this culture symbolised blacks‟ overt demonstration of resistance 
to apartheid rule and meant the payment boycotts of municipal services, rents and 
other tariffs. Even though non-payment of municipal services has persisted in the 
new political dispensation, its meaning has transformed. Non-payment does not 
indicate opposition to the new democratic rule. In the literature, two explanations 
are proposed for the persistence of non-payment in the post-apartheid period. One 
explanation for the culture of non-payment in the post-1994 election period plays 
down the inability to pay for services, arguing that non-payment is due to the 
“culture of entitlement” (Fjeldstad 2004). For municipalities, non-payment 
reduces revenue from rates and services charges. The reduction in revenue has 
implications for the provision of basic services. Without sufficient internal 
revenue, most local governments have no other means of financing the provision 
of basic services and have to make do with transfers, which are too minimal to 
make a difference.  
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Another explanation for non-payment is related to affordability. The high 
unemployment rate aptly illustrates this view. Unemployment means that an 
individual does not have a job. Without a paid job, there is no income with which 
to buy services such as water and electricity. As Mogale City demonstrates, the 
rate of unemployment is high and this contributes to non-payment, according to 
respondents. The unemployed make up 20.76% of Mogale City‟s total labour 
force, whereas Gauteng‟s is at 17.79% (CoGTA 2009). The key reason given by 
councillors and executive managers for the high unemployment rate in Mogale 
City is that many of the mines within the municipality and industries located in 
Chamdor
5
 had shut down. But activists disagree. Activist 5 (February 4, 2011) 
observes that most of the industries employ people who are working in Mogale 
City, but who do not reside within the boundaries of the municipality. The 
majority of young adults, who head families, are not working and they are 
unlikely to pay for municipal services with the scanty income they earn from odd 
jobs, if they are able to get any (ibid). Activist 6 indicates that the municipality 
awards small tenders to companies that come from outside the municipality and 
these companies bring their own workers along.  
 
According to Manager 4 (December 8, 2010), councillors are telling poor people 
in township not to pay for services or are instructing managers to stop cut-offs in 
black areas for political motives. In other words, this respondent argues, 
politicians seek to maximise their vote and they are doing so in their 
constituencies in townships. By contrast, in the more affluent areas, there is a 
concerted effort to recover payments, which are implemented via cut-offs. If 
somebody has not paid by the seventh day of the month, they will put a notice on 
the gate and they will cut off (DA Councillor 2, December 3, 2011). With the 
persistence of non-payment in all its manifestations, the provision of basic 
services is severely affected.  
 
                                                          
5
 Chamdor is an industrial area that is located adjacent to Kagiso, one of the densely populated 
townships in Mogale City Local Municipality.  
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The persistence of the non-payment of municipal services after the first 
democratic elections sparked the municipal fiscal crisis in the 1990s (McDonald 
and Pape 2002, Wafer at al 2008 and Bond 1998). For municipalities, this fiscal 
crisis increased the debt burden, and reduced revenue from services and charges. 
Yorke (2003) reports that consumers owed municipalities about R22.5 billion for 
rates and services charges as at 31 March 2002. The South African government 
tried to reverse the non-payment of services by launching a massive publicity 
campaign called Masakhane, a Zulu word that means “we are building”. 
Masakhane was launched in 1995. One of the aims of Masakhane that rose to 
prominence was “promoting the resumption of rent, service charge and bond 
payments” (Timm et al 1998). A year after Masakhane was unveiled the ANC 
admitted that the campaign is synonymous with getting black communities to pay 
for services. Subtly, Masakhane attempted to court black communities into a 
“partnership with the state” (Naidoo 2010). The “partnership” insinuates that the 
government sought to lure people to pay for their services so that the state could 
generate income that helps it provide these services on a sustainable basis.  
 
From this reciprocal perspective, blacks have the responsibility to pay for services 
as this ensures sustainable provision of these in the future. With payments, the 
government remains fiscally sound to deliver services over the longer terms. 
Payment of services, the ANC (1996) reasoned, was part of “building a sense of 
ownership, responsibility and active citizenship”. The argument is that if a user 
has the right to access to water, say, he or she has the responsibility to look after 
this scarce resource by paying for it (McDonald and Pape 2002). Most people, 
including low-income earners, accept civic responsibility to pay the full cost of 
service delivery and are happy to do so as long as the services are reliable, 
affordable and of good quality (ibid). But Masakhane failed to encourage blacks 
to pay for services. This failure was “due to high unemployment rates and the 
introduction of flexible labour, which make it impossible for large parts of the 
population to pay for the services they need” (Naidoo 2010).  
 
78 
 
After Masakhane, municipalities started adopting direct enforcement and harsher 
measures to force non-payers to pay for services. In the fourth quarter of 1997 
nearly all municipalities began widespread cut-offs of basic services to non-payers 
(Bond, 1998: 41). Municipalities also used restrictive practices to force people to 
succumb to the payment of services. For instance, those who did not pay for water 
were often disconnected or restricted to the free basic amount through flow-
restrictors or prepayment water meters (Wafer at al 2008). In other instances, 
people‟s properties were repossessed to settle accounts in arrears (Deedat et al 
2001). Cutting off services lasted for weeks or months and, in some cases, 
involved permanent removal of infrastructure to prevent illegal reconnection 
(McDonald and Pape 2002: 19). But these enforcement measures became “too 
visible and politically inexpedient” (Ruiters, 2007: 492). This suggests that the 
government realised that people might react by withholding their votes for the 
ANC.  
 
For its part, Mogale City has adopted both soft and harsh measures to deal with 
non-payment. The municipality sends out notice to anyone who does not pay 
within seven days of each month. If he or she does not come forward and make 
arrangements, the municipality cuts electricity supply and restrict water. Mogale 
City offers incentives to those who owe. If a household makes an arrangement to 
pay, 10% of the amount it owes will be cancelled.  
 
According to executive managers, Mogale City has also devised the so-called 
revenue enhancement strategy. This strategy, which started in 2008, concentrates 
on credit control, including the appointment of debt collectors. Before 2008, 
payment levels were at around 80%-85% and now they have risen to an average 
92% (Manager 3, November 10, 2010). The strategy also assists in terms of how 
the municipality can increase its revenue collection and broaden revenue base 
(Manager 4, December 8, 2010). To achieve this, the municipality focused on data 
cleansing as some of its consumer information is not correct. In simple terms, data 
cleansing means correcting inaccurate records. Data cleansing assists to ensure 
that whenever the municipality implements credit control it knows from whom it 
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is collecting. For instance, explains this respondent, the basis for the municipality 
to bill people is title deeds information. Some times the municipality does not 
know who the owner is. Title deeds information gives little information maybe the 
names of deeds holders, and identity documents are not there. In certain cases, the 
municipality does not have physical addresses and sends accounts to wrong 
addresses. Now the municipality goes to stand numbers and tries to identify who 
is staying there and who the owner of that property is. What this means is that 
Mogale City is trying to keep an accurate record of its ratepayers. This promises 
to allow the municipality to bill the right people and improve debt collection rates 
in townships. Enforcement measures such as data cleansing imply that Mogale 
City diverts some of its resources, time and money, away from helping basic 
service provision.  
 
Residents of Mogale City accept prepaid meters because it is “fair” (Activist 5, 
February 4, 2011) and “you use what you can afford” (Activist 6, February 4, 
2011). But poor communities in certain other municipalities have fiercely resisted 
prepaid metering. In one instance, payment dropped from 38% in June to about 
27% now, Zwane (2001) quoted the Greater Nelspruit Utility Company as saying. 
In other instances, some households took local authorities to court over prepaid 
meters (Tissington et al 2008). Other studies reveal the negative welfare effects of 
the prepaid metering. Ruiters (2007: 499) illustrates how turning tap water into a 
prepaid meter compels poor residents not only to “economize falsely”, but also to 
revert to “unsafe sources”. This is primarily because poor people start using 
nearby rivers and stagnant ponds for drinking water, cleaning and bathing.  
 
Mogale City may have not had overt resistance to prepaid meters, but it is battling 
with illegal connections. Mogale City does not supply electricity to Kagiso, the 
municipality‟s biggest township. But it supplies water to this township. Kagiso is 
where the biggest part of illegal connections comes from. The municipality has 
illegal connections even in white suburbs. At the moment, distributional losses of 
electricity come to about 15% and distributional losses of water is more than 28% 
(Manager 3). Exacerbating distributional losses, Mogale City experiences cable 
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theft, copper and iron theft, and stealing of water meter covers, according to DA 
Councillor 2. The cost of theft to the municipality is probably between R2 million 
and R3 million a month (ibid). Some respondents note that people bypass 
electricity and water to avoid paying for services. But others insist that the 
municipality bypasses when it takes faulty meters for repairs.  
You can‟t call it a bypassing. Sometimes the problem is within the 
institution. Recently the mayor had a problem with his meter. It was taken 
for repairs or whatever to be replaced. It took time for our own employees 
to go back. You can‟t say you bypassed in such a case. The mayor had to 
come to me and say: “I have been shouting this manager from time to 
time.” Bypassing (of this nature) creates a problem for indigents. For 
instance you report a prepaid meter that is broken. They come and bypass. 
After three to six months, they just bill you. Whose fault is that? That is 
the municipality‟s fault (ANC Councillor 2, December 3, 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Even if government succeeds in meeting its targets of universal access to basic 
services by 2014, this does not necessarily mean the poor will gain access to free 
basic services. Judging by the current approach to indigent management, any 
improvements in access to basic services and the related benefits thereof are likely 
to be limited to those who make it to the indigent register. The indigent policy has 
raised the barrier for some poor households, preventing them from access to basic 
services. While this policy does assist certain poor people to access minimum 
levels of basic services, it has not gone far enough to reach out to other poor 
people.  
 
Most of the poor are subjected to the harsh realities of commodification and must 
abide by its guiding principle: “you get what you pay for”. Those who cannot 
afford services and, are not on an indigent register, have no access to the basic 
provisions at all. Unless the indigent policy changes in line with the government‟s 
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drive to accelerate access to basic services, most of the needy people face 
exclusion from access to basic services. For its part, the non-payment of services 
has affected debt collection and constrained municipalities‟ ability in terms of 
available money to provide services. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study sought to explore how the South African government has restructured 
intergovernmental transfers in the post-1994 era. One of the key aims was to 
determine how the restructuring of transfers has assisted Mogale City to fulfil its 
constitutional obligations and responsibilities to provide basic services like 
sufficient water, basic sanitation and refuse removal to the poor. While transfers 
have been instrumental in helping Mogale City finance the provision of some 
level of access to basic services to certain poor people, these have failed to cast 
the net wide enough to cover the majority of poverty-stricken people. As this 
study has shown, scores of destitute people in Mogale City still lack the 
“necessities of life”. Transfers have failed to bolster Mogale City‟s ability to 
provide free basic services to a huge number of poor households.  
 
Several reasons are attributed to this. First, needy individuals face the harsh 
realities of the logic of commodification. They are compelled to buy basic 
services like water and to pay the full price for them as Mogale City, like other 
municipalities, has commodified these services. The municipality has priced basic 
services, and has installed prepaid meters to enforce payment and ensure cost 
recovery. Even the conventional meters manifest themselves in commodification 
in that they reinforce the payment of municipal services. The basic point is that 
commodification turns constitutionally recognised basic services into private 
goods. In line with this logic, one‟s consumption of water, for instance, prevents 
others from accessing it and those who cannot pay for water are denied access to 
it. Put differently, those who can afford to buy water have access to the 
commodity for as long as they afford to pay for it. However, those who cannot 
buy water have no access to it. Thus this market-driven approach to service 
delivery – where basic services are commodified – has not only exacerbated 
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inequalities and poverty, but it has also deprived the poor of their constitutional 
rights to essential services.  
 
Second, transfers have failed to help Mogale City reduce prices of basic services 
to affordable levels at the very least for the poor. With the aid of transfers, Mogale 
City has tried to make sure that those who cannot afford do get some level of 
minimum basic services. Households that receive subsidised basic services still 
pay for them if they consume more than the minimum free basic service 
allocations. The subsidy, however insufficient it may be, at least guarantees them 
access to some basic services. As has been noted, Mogale City does provide 
partially subsidised basic services via the LGES.  
 
Mogale City has also adopted cross-subsidisation, which appears to be an attempt 
to decommodify basic services. But this model relies on higher consumption. The 
higher the consumption, the higher the price. High prices suggest that services 
become expensive for the poor. Mogale City provides 6kl of free basic water a 
month to everyone. Using cross-subsidisation as the means to decommodify by 
offering the first 6kl for free is proving to be ineffective. Once households use 
more than 6kl, they start paying more for water. Households in townships tend to 
consume more water arguably not because they waste this scarce resource, but 
because the number of members in each household is much higher than official 
estimates. Therefore, the impact of higher prices is mainly felt by the poor. In the 
case of low-income earners, higher prices either make water unaffordable to them 
or leave them with debt especially if they are on conventional meters. As for the 
municipality, it does not generate revenue if people cannot afford to buy water or 
it could end up sitting on ballooning debt due to defaults. Changes to the transfer 
system are hardly flexible enough to take affordability into account.  
 
Third, falling transfers in real terms has further weakened Mogale City‟s ability to 
meet its operational and capital expenditure needs and thus inhibiting its efforts to 
provide basic services. As has been demonstrated, South Africa‟s 
intergovernmental transfer system has been restructured to fit the requirements of 
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commodification. It has done so by cutting transfers to municipalities and making 
local government rely increasingly on internal revenues. Generating internal 
revenue means that the municipality has to thrive on cost-recovery and sell 
services to earn income. But Mogale City‟s expenditure requirements exceed its 
available financial resources, namely transfers and internal revenue. As a 
consequence, Mogale City has chronic insufficient capital budget. It is constrained 
in undertaking capital projects, like upgrading Azaadville‟s electricity 
infrastructure. Municipalities‟ reliance on their own financial resources to fund 
some of the basic service infrastructure further limits their ability to deliver free 
basic services equitably. Mogale City spends massive financial resources of its 
own on the maintenance of infrastructure rather than reducing the infrastructure 
backlog and improving the provision of basic services equitably. There are no 
transfers that cover infrastructure maintenance.  
 
Fourth, underspending due to late wiring of transfers to Mogale City also 
constrains its ability to provide basic services. As has been indicated, national 
government and provinces engage in “fiscal dumping” to avoid being seen to be 
underspending. But late transfers do not give municipalities sufficient time to 
spend the money and this leaves them at the risk of underspending. 
Underspending suggests that infrastructure plans are either scrapped or delayed 
altogether. To tackle fiscal dumping, the financial year ends should be the same 
for all spheres of government.  
 
Fifth, the transfer model itself is flawed as it concentrates on a municipality‟s 
income and outdated population statistics. This has direct impact on Mogale 
City‟s capability to provide basic services to its poor communities as the demand 
for these services is increasing rapidly, while transfers have not kept pace with 
this growth demand. As Shiceka acknowledges, the local government funding 
model is “limited and narrow”, only taking into account population numbers and 
income. Mogale City is subject to this formula. Mogale City is graded 4. Grading 
determines how much in transfers municipalities should get. Mogale City is 
struggling to keep up with rising demand for basic services as informal 
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settlements continue to sprawl, unemployment rises and non-payment of services 
continues.  
 
Sixth, transfers are not only insufficient, but they also target few poor people who 
are listed on the indigent register. The study states clearly that Mogale City uses 
its indigent register as the conduit through which it subsidises free basic service to 
the poor. A poor person who is on an indigent register gains access to free basic 
services. But the indigent register under-represents those who would benefit from 
this free allocation. There area number of poor people who are excluded from this 
register. For a poor household to qualify as indigent it has to be assessed in terms 
of the indigent policy. This means that beneficiaries of common basic services 
like standpipes and portable toilets predominantly in informal settlements are not 
necessarily indigents because they have not been assessed in terms of the indigent 
policy and its qualification criteria. Currently, the provision of these common 
basic services is poor and unreliable. The national government could add the 
provision of basic services to informal settlements into its local government 
equitable share formula.  
 
In their current forms, indigent registers are inappropriate vehicles through which 
to channel transfers that finance the provision of basic services. Before they enjoy 
these benefits, indigents are assessed in accordance with the municipality‟s 
indigent policy. As one of the qualification criteria, Mogale City requires indigent 
applicants to have an active municipal account. If poor households are not 
registered through the indigent programmes because they do not possess a 
municipal account, another other requirements, they do not receive free basic 
services. People living in informal settlements, for instance, do not have the proof 
of municipal accounts. Automatically, they are excluded from the register. The 
municipality should design its indigent policy in such as way that it accounts for 
any poor person who requires assistance in accessing basic services whether they 
are in possession of municipal accounts and other documents or not.   
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Seventh, transfers do not help Mogale City tackle the challenge of extending free 
basic services to the “near-poor”. Due consideration needs to be taken to define 
the so-called “near-poor”. This group of people fall outside the threshold needed 
to qualify for indigent assistance, yet they have insufficient money to pay for 
basic services. Broadly, transfers should consider the “near-poor” in the LGES 
formula. There is already a heated debate around the income threshold in Mogale 
City. There has been a proposal to increase the threshold and there has been a 
recommendation to target certain poor areas and offer blanket approval (Manager 
2, December 3, 2010). Both of these ideas have been shot down.  
 
Eighth, administrative problems at Mogale City seem to blunt the effectiveness of 
transfers. Highlighted in this report is the billing system in Mogale City, which is 
affecting indigent beneficiaries. Approved indigents receive statements that reflect 
old balances and their bills do not reflect rebates. In Mogale City, the indigent 
management process is centralised. The municipality could decentralise the 
indigent registration process and tap into the existing structures. For instance, 
every ward in Mogale City has a ward committee. Ward offices are much closer to 
the people on the ground. At the ward level, ward councillors, community liaison 
officers (CLOs), and community development workers (CDWs) could be 
mobilised to get involved in the indigent registrations. This could bolster the 
municipality‟s capacity. Involving community structures mentioned above could 
bring the indigent registration process closer to the people.  
 
Ninth, transfers are proving ineffective in assisting Mogale City counter the 
negative effects of non-payment off services. Mogale City is battling with the 
non-payment of services, as has been noted. Some registered indigents, who are 
using conventional meters, struggle to pay because they cannot monitor their 
water or electricity consumption, incurring debt. The non-payment of services 
affects debt collection and will also affect a municipality‟s ability in terms of 
available money to provide services. For municipalities, non-payment reduces 
revenue from rates and services charges. The reduction in revenue has 
implications for the provision of basic services. Without sufficient internal 
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revenue, most local governments have no other means of financing the provision 
of basic services and have to make do with transfers, which are too minimal to 
make a difference.  
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APPENDIX 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Mogale City Local Municipality 
 
Manager 1   November 10, 2010 
Manager 2   January 14, 2011 
Manager 3   November 10, 2010 
Manage 4   December 8, 2010 
Manager 5   November 10, 2010  
Manager 6   January 14, 2011 
Manage 7   January 6, 2011 
 
West Rand District Municipality  
 
WRDM Manager 1  January 6, 2011  
 
Rand Water  
 
Rand Water Manager 1 February 2, 2011 
 
ANC Councillors 
 
ANC councillor 1  January 14, 2011 
ANC Councillor 2  December 3, 2010 
ANC Councillor 3  December 14, 2010 
ANC Councillor 4  November 26, 2010 
ANC Councillor 5  November 26, 2010 
ANC Councillor 6  November 26, 2010 
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ANC Councillor 7  December 3, 2010 
 
 
DA Councillors 
 
DA councillor 1  December 14, 2010  
DA Councillor 2  December 3, 2011  
DA Councillor 3  December 14, 2010 
 
Activists 
 
Activist 1   February 4, 2011 
Activist 2   February 4, 2011  
Activist 3   February 4, 2011 
Activist 4   February 4, 2011 
Activist 5   February 4, 2011 
Activist 6   February 5, 2011 
Activist 8   February 4, 2011  
Activist 9   February 4, 2011  
Activist 10   February 4, 2011  
Activist 11   February 5, 2011  
Activist 12   February 5, 2011 
Activist 13   February 5, 2011 
Activist 14   February 5, 2011 
Activist 15   February 6, 2011 
